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ABSTRACT
WILLIAM JOHNSTON OPPENHEIMER: How his Leadership Methods,
Characteristics, and Abilities allowed him to Succeed
(Under the direction of Dr. John A. Lobur)

Throughout the course of this work I discuss Caesar as a leader, examining the
strategies that allowed him to be continually successful throughout his career. I begin
with a description of leadership theory, explaining the characteristics and skill necessary
for effective leadership. I then proceed with an outline of his life and political career,
from his exile during Sulla’s dictatorship to his ultimate demise. I include an explanation
of the historical political situation facing Rome as Caesar entered politics as well. I then
describe his early political career and his tenure in Gaul, using specific instances
illustrating his effective leadership and thereby explaining his success. Then, I highlight
his actions in the Civil War and victory over the Pompeians. I conclude by explaining
why his leadership methods, which succeeded throughout his career, ultimately brought
his demise.
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Introduction
Nearly two miliennia after his assassination. Gains Julius Caesar remains one of
the most effective leaders in all of history. Through his political savvy and military
genius. Caesar rose to supreme power over the Roman state. His success made him a
legend in his own time and established him as an integral figure in Western political
culture. Roman Emperors took his name upon ascendance to power. Dante Alighieri
punished Brutus and Cassius alongside Judas, the betrayer of Jesus. His legacy inspired
Shakespeare to compose a drama about him more than a millennium and a half later.
Even the Russians and (lennans paid homage to him. calling their emperors Czar and
Kaiser, respect!\ ely. Caesar not only transfonued the world in which he lived, he became
an icon in We.siem Civilization.
Though he did not come from a particularly wealthy or powerful family, Caesar
rose through the ranks of the cursi4s honorum,(the successive line of Roman
administrative positions), to its highest position through effective leadership methods.*
He manipulated the political system in the face of powerful opposition, overcoming the
dynastic families dominating Roman political system. He won stunning victories at
Alesia and Pharsalus, conquered Gaul and emerged \ ictorioiis in a multi-front Civil War.
In the proce

OP

r aesai united the Roman populace behind his political vision. With the

' Matthias Gelzcr.('uesar: Po'iticum and Statesman, nans. Peter Needham (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard
University Pass 19<^4V 19.

devotion of his soldiers and the common man. Caesar was granted the position ‘‘Dictator
for life."'
His incredible careers in politics and on the battlefield make Caesar the
consummate leader of his era. He has been reviewed as a politician, statesman, soldier
and tyrant. But this proficient leader has not been examined by modem standards of
leadership, and so remains a great candidate for study. Political culture has evolved since
his time, but the leadership methods Caesar employed are still applicable in today’s
political environment. Furthcnnore. there exists a wealth of information concerning
Caesar and his era. including primary and secondary sources, from which an accurate
impression of his leadership technique can be drawn.
During the tumuliuous late Republican period and Civil War Caesar acted in
almost total compliance wMih the tenets of modern leadership theory, and met with
incredible success. Once in absolute power as Dictator, however, he saw little open
opposition. But Caesar thrived on opposition- it offered him a clear enemy to overcome
and win fame in the process. With the major opiimates defeated and their allies in hiding,
he had no one tc fight. A shift in the political paradigm occurred wdth his victory in the
Civil War,but Caesar neglected to adapt his leadership style to fit the new model. His
rejection of the Republic incited discontent in traditional elite, who conspired against
him. This failure to adjust proved to be the weakness in his leadership method, and
allowed his downfall.
In this work I analyze and expose the ways in which Caesar’s leadership methods
compare to those advocated in modern leadership theory. 1 first begin with an
examination of modern leadership theory, setting forth criteria necessary for effective
" Plutarch, Life of Caesar. 57.

leadership. From there 1 discuss Caesai's life and times, in order to give the reader a basic
understanding c.f this period. 'I his section explains exclusive governing class in Rome
and the turbulent socio-t)olidcal situation facing the city, thereby revealing the obstacles
in Caesar’s path.
The next section concerns Caesar's early political career, from his appointment as
militaiy tribune through. Ids first term as Con.sul. Flis early life and maneuvers form the
foundation of his leadership style, and explain his rise to power from relative obscurity.
Follov ing tliat chapter. 1 will examine Caesar’s miliiar>’ career at length. His successes
on the batileTeld keep him in the public spotlight in Rome duiing his ten years as
Proconsul of Caul. His conquest of Gaul puts him in position to challenge his opposition
and avoid prosecution in the capital. Victory in the Civil War, which broke out as a result
of this challenge, leaves Caesar unopposed in Rome. His successful military leadership,
therefore, enables him to return to political power once more.
Althougli avv'ay on military campaign. Caesar simultaneously exercises his
political abiliti

in Rome during the Gallic and Civil Wars. In the next section, I

illustrate how successfuUy lie controls both the government and public opinion in Rome
while abroad. H e elevates bis friends and allies to important positions and secures his
post in Gaif foi* a decade, which enables him to earn the de\ otion of his troops and
accumulate incredible amounts of v'ealth. All the while he wins the support of the Roman
populace by sending treasures, slaves, ana tales of glory home in celebration of his
victories, reflecting his'
great image. His political maneuvers during the wars allow his
militarv successes to ha\e th.e great effect they did. providing him with the clout

necessary tc resume po>\er in the Eternal City. The people, consequently, declared
Caesar peipetual dictator.
No one before him enjoyed such demotion Irom the populace. Caesar became
king, effectively, at his con.stituents' request, only without the title. Although members
of the Senate betrayed and assassinated him. he nonetheless achieved the almost
inconceivable. The Roiiian emperors who followed him. the European kings who came
after them, and even Mu.ssolini looked to nis career for exemplary leadership. Not only
was Caesar the most capable leader of his day. he virtually defines effective leadership.

.1

Chapter i
Modern Leadership Theor>
Modem ieadersh.ip theory seeks to define the concept of leadership in its totality.
James MacGreg<)r Burns, the doyen of this field, divides leadership into two categories:
“iransactionar' and “transforming.” The more common of the two. transactional
leadership, comprises some exchange between the leader and the follower. When a leader
promises lower '.axes in return for \'otes. or plunder for military service, he employs
transactional leadership, \\hth both parties satisfied through the transaction, however, the
leader aiid follo'ver can pari ways until their interests converge once more. Thus,there is
no enduring bond between leader and follower, and theretore no development of loyalty
3

or a common identity between the two. Most politicians in democracies embody this
type of leadership, pronusiig jobs, lower taxes, and other benefits to their constituents in
return for vote

fransactional leadership, therefore, translates into short-term policies

and provisions fransactional leaders are little more than c»;)ntractors to their constituents.
On the other hand. :he rarer and more effective type of leadership.
transfonnational leadership, appears wJien the leader uses a deeper motivation to inspire
and develop a relationship with followers. Some issue,(whether ideological, social, or
circumstantial,.such as thre ii of foreign inva.‘^ion), threatens society with far reaching
implications and aIlo\A's the transformational leader to emerge. This leader envisions a
solution to the c.isis and a better future for his people, uniting followers behind his

^ James MacGrciio'^ F3urns, / cod ■ship (Kevv York: Harpci <k Row. 1978). 20

platform and cliarisina. Bcuh transactional and transfonnaiional leadership necessitate
followers' belief in their leader's capability for success. But transformational leadership
depends on "moral leadersnip," in which follower^^ trust their leader and his principles.
Therefore, the leader not only promises to transform certain aspects of society, but
assumes total responsibiiiu for fulfilling those promises.'* Adept transformational leaders
translate their visions into long-temi significant change and even revolution, distinctly
impacting their worlds,( atsar. however. effecii\ ely employs both types of leadership.
First of all. r leader needs pow er. In a repr.blican system like Caesar’s, as
Machiavelli asserts, there are two ways of acquiring power: through support from the
populace or the elite. t ach offers power with specific strengths and weaknesses, and
Machiavelli pre'ers popular support. But powder aione does not necessitate leadership; the
two are related V'Ui differeru. Power is the capability of the w'ielder to exercise resources,
(military, economic, institutional, and personal ability), to influence others in order to
achieve the wielder's goals. Absolute power, in the sense of Louis XIV, does not truly
exemplify leadershio. In such situations, followers are actually subjects because of the
lack of real alternativ es. T lio powerful utilizes his power, derived from wealth, sworn
fealty, or military might, in sole consideration for his own priorities. If the power wielder
motivates the follower to act towards mutual goals and aspirations, however, he becomes
a leader.' This is not to say that leaders do not use coercion for personal and selfish ends;
they most definitely do from time to time. But to paraphrase John Locke, the leader

Bums,4.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The f rince. trans. David Wooton (Indianapolis; Hackett, 1995), 31.
Burns, 18.
’Bums, 19.
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draws his power from his folioweis without auress. I'he) willingly support him. In
turn, the leader :nus» ensure that the people have an interest in preserving him and his
power, allowing him to iead.'^ Thus, leadership obviously depends on power, but is a
specific methoG of wielding it.
Both traiisactioiud and transfomriatioral leaders employ several qualities, abilities,
and talents in oider to aehitwe success. A shaip iniellect is an absolute necessity. To
succeed in c’vil adininistvadon. foreign policy, public speech, and military strategy, the
leader; musi access sitiiatior s to form creative solutions and outsmart his opponents.
Even at the sUi^ cf his :cneer, lie must understand the institutions surrounding him to
formulate a plan for rising to power. Full comprehension ot the rules and traditions of
political institutions is essential, allowing him to avoid condict as well as manipulate the
system arid tliose .irounc' him. The leader should be schooled in the aits of politics, war
and philosophy, as wed as mathematics and the humanities. This scholarly intellect
manifests itself m and ciihances all of his other abilities. A.s Plato asserts, states should
be run b>. and therefore tiie best leaders were, highl)' intelligent and moral philosopher-

kings.

K

Beyond the scholastic realm, the leader must have practical intelligence to
understand peooie. Conrmcnly referred to as "street smarts, this perception allows him
to win strategic allies and influence others. By recognizing his constituents’ needs, he
shapes his policies and platforms properly to maximize popular support. Moreover, he
uses this undei sianding to outmaneuver his opponents and counter their intrigues. In
virtually all cates, this facet of intelligence supercedes academics in importance to the
John Locke. 7v'< ’»ec'C'-Sc”’
^ Machiavclli, 34
10
Plato, The Repui he, 473L

('nvern'}u^:iK Ch. 2, Sec. 4.

7

leader. Many successliil leaders manipulate people without scholarly intellect. But
superiority in each splic e provides distinct ad\ antages. and the most successful leaders
exhibit both.
Nevertln ’ess.

m the most astute politician wouici achieve nothing without
11

ambition: he must be persistently motivated >o reach the highest echelons of power.
But ambition cannot be blind- it must have logical boundaries. By breaking his non
aggression pad .vith the Soviet Union in 1941. .\dolt Hitler s unquenchable and unsound
ambilior. opencu a iwo troni war in Europe. He neglected belter council, embarking on a
campaign against a per pic he underestimated. By failing to invade and conquer Britain
first, as he should ha\ e. Hiller's empire w^as overwhelmed by a multi-front war.
Therefore, the g^eal leader must ha\ e high ambilions, but understand the reasonable
limitations on w hat he can achieve at any gi\ en time. He must utilize his ambition and
the char.srna that comes with it, but wisely distinguish when to follow a more prudent
course in the hitcrest oT’amg term goals.
An essential bynroduct of this ambition is a notion of confident determination,
fhe ambitious leader guuiinely believes that he can and will attain his goals, so much so
that others have compleic confidence in him. A general s decisive action at critical
moments can tiu n the tide of battle and win the day. Alexander the Great often rushed
into battle at pivv;)Tai oolnts, rallying his army with his courage. Similarly, the politician
camiot succiim'p to ])ar

In debate or under crhicism. He must be confident in his cause

and determined o defend it. maintaining his composure and repelling all attacks. Many
have great ambition, bni lew command the contidence and determination to contend for
power regardles.s of opn<^sition.
Bums, 1 12.
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Finiheni.ore. great leadership requires moral consistency. And this is not simply a
matter of a>\va> ● doing \\ hat is good or right, h means an unfailing dedication to a
specific code of values ' he impoilaace of tins is two-fo’d. First of all, consistency
inspires conl'idcuce in the leader. In the 2004 Presidential Election John Kerry made the
mistake '.»f ehai'.jiinz his position on certain issues. President Bush responded by labeling
him a ■ il'p-tiopper.'vvrieh brought Kerry's consistency under scrutiny and hurt him in
the public ovi}. Though the leader may be connoting and malicious at times, he cannot
betray the principles held dear by his constiti'en^}. Secondl}. in unconditionally tying
himself lO aii: hnirable ^et of standards, he bec.tmes their embodiment. To achieve this
he must choose nspirational qualities, and then demonstrate his com.mitment to them
through claboiavc gesture

For example, American piesidenis often show their

dedicaiic>n to education hy reading to children m public schools, which they receive
publicity for. i lie leader s \ alues not only shape his persona and platfonn, they lend
credence to his *.ause. Moral consistency, therefore, is an important aspect of
transfbrmarionc.i lesdttsP.p. in that there is not an exchange but a convergence of
12

values.

All of ihcse characteristics, however, mean nothing if the leader cannot
demonsUaie thciti. Ifhetoric is an es.sential, especially to a Roman. It allows him to
clearlv articulate his purpose from, the rostruiv, (speaker s platform). \^'hether defending,
proseciiiinu, dehaiitig, or addressing his men before battle or in an assembly, the leader
must speak with eloquen c and effect. He must nresent his thoughts in a convincing
manner and win suppoF for his policies. The power of speech cannot be underestimated.

Bums. 30.
q
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Rhetoric exposes the IcaJor's charisma and enables him to mobilize support.

Likewise,

the pow'^r ol speech moii /atcs men :o fight bravely and wi .li determination. Speeches
like Abraham Lincoln's “Gettvsbursi Address" have been immortalized because of the
impact the\ had on botli military’ and public morale, thereby atfecting the course of
history. The Romans depended on rhetoric to express themselves, as the ability to read
was limited. .\Uhough mosi people did not vv itne.ss speeches in the Senate, an orator
gained a valuah

repiiialien from sneaking effectively. IGietoric, therefore, was one of

the Roman leader's mt»sl potent meihods of inlluence.
Des’pite .aiributes like intellect, ambition, moral consistency, and rhetoric, the
leader must ha\

ipplicablc skills and tactics v.’th w hich te» achieve his goals.

Governmental aarninisir n ion is an important part of leadership, allow ing the leader to
utilize his superior pcr.sonal qualities. Managing public w^orks. finances, security,
maintaining oracr. and handling cr ,cs require the leader to produce logical creative
solutions. When someone proves competent m low’er level administration they are likely
to receive more responsibilit}’. .A.s they' rise through the ranks ol public service, good
public official.s -mpro\'c the lifestyles of their constituents and win their appreciation. In
Rome,a snccestive line r-f position existed witliln the government allowing politicians to
advance from ll e lowest le\ els of administration to the highest. In modern times,
Rudolph Giuliani began his political career pri'secuting organized crime as a United
States Attorney, lie gained fame because of his success in 'dismantling and incapacitating
the mafia, and vas consequently elected Mayor of New \ork City. Ihen, he competently
handled the cris.s of Sepivirnber 11, 2001. Although there is some controversy over
whether he dese-ves credit for all of these successes, he has nonetheless gained a national
Bums, 72; 3 18-U
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repuiai’cn ind > aiuis a-.

: i

oiitrujiriv r ibr ihe Rerublicrii-! Prcsiciential nomination in

2008.
Obviousb compacnt lovw^r-lcvel adminislraiors become popular for their actions
and rise ihiouifn iho ran\-. ol govcrrjrient mo'v v.uickly. \’i
incompewnce. i ' the \c:k.

\ ersa. the people loathe

cannot effectively deiegalc responsibi'-ty and at least keep the

civil mbaniiiCt-. ic 'v'OJki.^g he forfeiis his ca/eei. Therefor?, administrative skills can
deterv'Uie 'A hefnc a leacier Vs ill rise lo power quickly, graciualh’. or not at all.
■mhur

leadership has been of the utmost importance to leaders

throughoiu hisi ly It can be transactional or translormational, depending upon the
general ;', succci at d his goals. Military actior, can iransiorrn society, both by conquering
new peoples aiic f>\ inciMig i ●evoludon. However, transactional military leadership occurs
when the lead

isc.s {'o”';c TO invt uJe a foreign land, not for conquest, but for plunder to

pay hif troops, ●..iihoucn ixditical success no louger depends as heavily on military
succes.s in vnodefn lime

,s in ancient, tlie armed forces remain a good starting point for a

careci in politic'-.. Through immense success vin the batiletiold, a great soldier or general
exhibits '.b

sma uccessarv to c liter politics .vithout having a prior political career.

Dwight D. hisc'frio\t ei and L b> ssos S. Orant used their military careers as springboards
to the IVcsidcnc ● . The C-on.si lship the highest political ami mil’tary position of ancient
Rome. aUciwed die leadc to wan wealth through conquest. That wealth, in turn, was used
to pa}' his soldiers and

kc bene\ oient gestures to the populace, recruiting more

followers. Ry e.Mending the greatness of his nation thrcuigh victor} and conquest, the
i4

military leader; .eceives thine and li/xe from the cvimmon man.

ITYective battlefield

leadership also :\ings the sincere devotion of sr<khevs. which brings security and
14

Bums. 246
1 1

increase^. the !V- Ci''tia} r ever of tlic leader. In enics ofliiniioil and revolution, the leader
with tlio most di. dicatcd ino, well trahied solaieis po.^es a serious threat to opposition.
Throueli his r.iTi.iar' c:.voi. the loader demoiist-aies his iniellect, ambition, confidence.
and rhoieaieal s' if for all ;o ^ee. impro\ ing his reputation. Although not an absolute
requirement si., cessfui military leadership can pro\ e an extreinelv potent addition to
great lea.lersh'p
In exeo'jiirg hi- political, .tdiniiiislrativ o. and nr’li ry policies, the leader shapes
his publie inicgt

In nio.^T case.i he will not dlrecdv come into contact with his followers.

at least (.mi a re oiar bas.o. Therefore, his pub.icly perceived image e.xists as his primary
method o» mai

lining sI’.ppoit. He

can control his image in \ ariely of ways, such as

improving \pub) ''- 'Aorks, pro'dding public ccleorcitions. erecting statues and minting
coins. Ft'i insrti. ce. th*; fA^nuin Emperor Trajan erected a new Forum in his name with
plunder from hi' vrars with Dacia. The mag: ficeut structiirc not only improved the city
and its beaur . bat slood as reminder of his benevolence. Public works projects provide
evidence of a le ider’s Io\ e for his people.
On a di i ferent note, leaders iiave enhanced the ir image through religion and
ideologv. klaitj ancien

like the Pharaohs of Egvpt. claimed demi-god status or descent

from the gtta.s.

t leaders, on the other hand. V.

to eliminate religion. As Marx

himself I lilt it. ‘ E ligion . is the opiate of the people; sc tliey replace it with ideology
and a cult of peisonaiitt

Each, wnen used pngterh, rcsuli m greater dedication.

Regardless, hom of these strategic'^ allow the leads:r to o\ ei sliadow past leaders and leap
to the foreiront of fame and renown. The resulving transtc/onaiional leader has greater

15

Karl Mirx. Ct’ittaue ofthe flee^elicui Philosophy of R;yjiu IH40). iiurodiiction. quoted in John Bartlett,
Bartlett 's Familiur 0>i< tafi.'ns (Boston l.ittle. Brewn au.l Co .
.S').

lo>aIp foar! th-. popuh-. c as a resi li. Nrg^ec-’ji'i one's Inu ge pre\ ents a leader from
reachiin: ins ;:o.i 'nri.il. C. ompetito:v v\ili cons'.ar.' V seek to ta’-nish liis image and improve

their o \.

ill ilu proce

dix\ing

rrem whai:\ er posiiion he held in the public eye.

Great leaders

iTir,aoiisi v work towiuxls the cuhivat^oii of iheir images while

siiTiiihane('usI s

-nt disei eei l} damaging those of their coFitpedtors. All arenas of

leadersii p o;oa ee this image, which in turn ret'iects .he le.iGer's political vision,
; rc

leadc'- ●'■ees a better future, expresses it to followers, and leads them

tov/anis nrs;<i'ie tha- lut-ne a reali i
dedicah.>o ha’p 'ira to O’.

His irteileet. raribit.cr. derennination. and

le that visivvn. By a chieving miiimr\ greatness he can build

wealth, a. ic-vai ' irnv. an-, fame to lielp him as w cl. riuough rheto’*ic and image building
he piibneh v: ri

\ i.^ion i ecraiting followers from the masse.^; to overwhelm his

opponents. I hi*^ .’rand rolitical vision forms the heart of his leadership strategy.

16

Bums, ’0.

Chapter 2
An Overview of Caesar’s World and Career
At the close of the sixth century B.C. members of the Roman aristocracy
overthievv their last Etruscan King, Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, thereby establishing a
republic in the monarchy’s place.* Roughly four centuries later, at the birth of Julius
Caesar on July 13. 100 B.C., Rome remained a republic. Referring to Rome as a republic
by that point, however, was mainly nominal, because the government had become
dominated by the most powerful families of the Senate. Technically, the popular
assembly (comitia) of Roman citizens held legislative power. It ratified laws and elected
magistrates, but powerful Senators used their influence and money to secure their
interests in elections. Even Rome’s national motto,"’"‘Senatus Populusque Romanus.
acknowledged that the Senate came before the people.
Those holding the office of quaestor were enrolled in the Senate at the next census
following their one year terms. The Senate exercised auctoritas: its authority to advise
the popularly elected magistrates. The advice given, however, carried much more weight
than simple suggestions. Ignoring Senatorial advice, therefore, would anger the elders
and affect their future positions within that body. Why,then, would a quaestor oppose
the will of the Senate during his short one year term? His best interests were served by
appeasing the Senators and forming alliances with them, so that he would have support to

‘ Mary T. Boatwright, Daniel J. Gargola, and Richard J. A. Talbert, The Romans: From Village to Empire
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 48-9.
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run for higher office in a few years. Thus, auctoritas became a means of coercing
magistrates into obeying the Senate instead of merely advising them, and gave the Senate
a great deal of control over the executive branch of government." Similarly, today,
political parties exercise control over who will be elected through monetary support and

publicity.
Although Senatorial rank was not inheritable, members of certain families
continually found their ways into that body. Powerful families had long ago formed an
aristocracy, and their members continually maintained political power. It was such that
the nobiles, whose families had produced at least one consul, came to dominate the
Roman Senate and State.^ Nobiles comprised the highest stratus of the aristocracy
tlirough their wealth, connections, and family legacies. Dynasties like the Fabii, Comelii,
and Aemilii held power in Rome for long periods, although their lines sometimes fell into
decay."* Even so, they often adopted newcomers with high potential into their ranks, as
was the case with Gains Marius, and so retained their power. Their family names were
like brand names in the political arena. Simony also played a major part in politics, and
successful candidates shamelessly bribed the electorate to secure election. These
dynasties made Rome an oligarchy defacto, although it technically remained a republic.
While the populace could act against the Senate’s wishes, politicians generally choose
nd

not to exploit their potential and maintained the status quo. This changed in the 2
Century B.C.
By Caesar’s birth in 100 B.C., Rome was in turmoil. Its ever expanding empire
had brought it into control of vast foreign territories, slaves, and wealth through
“ Gelzer, 18.
’Gelzer, 2.
^ Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1939), 20.
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successful military campaigns. With these conquests, however, came several drawbacks.
First, in order to conduct these military operations, Rome had turned to other Italian
communities for manpower. It forged alliances with these peoples, keeping them
subordinate to Romans but maintaining their local autonomy.^ Although this
arrangement persisted for some time, the allies gradually became more and more
dissatisfied with their inferior status. Their malcontent would eventually force Rome to
appease their demands or face rebellion.
Simultaneously, Rome’s great territorial expansion and influx of wealth reshaped
society. The equites. or wealthy equestrian class, took the opportunity to benefit from
these wars. They could have run for office and joined the Senate, but chose to pursue
wealth over political prestige as Senators could not engage in commerce. Helping to
finance the wars and reconstruct new provinces, they became increasingly wealthy. When
the government needed someone to collect taxes from the new provinces, these knights
took on tax-farming contracts, making them wealthier and more corrupt. With their
amassed riches the equestrians bought up the cheap and war ravaged lands of Italy and
the provinces to form large estates. They, as well as Senators, employed slaves captured
in the wars to cultivate these estates, latifundia^ which had previously been smaller
subsistence farms.^ This drove former farmers into cities and greatly increased the urban
population, especially the number of poor. They had the money to pursue politics if they
chose, but generally preferred wealth to the public spotlight. Bribery could manipulate
those in power to their wills, and often did.

’Gelzer, 6.
^ Syme, 14.
^ J. F. C. Fuller, Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant(New York: De Capo Press, 1965), 20.
^ Syme, 14-5.
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Meanwhile, the state used its riches from the wars to embark upon large public
works projects, which increased commerce in the cities and enlarged the middle class.^
These wars had an effect similar to the Enclosure Acts of seventeenth and eighteenth
century Britain. They brought greater wealth to the wealthy and allowed middle class
businessmen to prosper, but the poor could still barely survive and were now crowded
inside the capital- like the dockworkers and immigrants of Victorian London. This
reconfiguration of Roman society combined with the growing unrest of its Italian allies
meant Rome would have to make serious modifications in its policies. Otherwise it risked
revolution.
But the Senatorial oligarchy vehemently resisted reform, seeking to maintain the
status quo in which it held power. Historically, the Senate always compromised with the
10

people at crucial moments and averted rebellion,

But in 134 B.C., the actions of the

tribune Tiberius Gracchus would begin a century of civil instability. He proposed an
agrarian reform bill which would redistribute public lands to provide for the poor.
Naturally, the Senate voted against the bill, but he tried to bring it before the assembly
anyway. The Senate manipulated another tribune to block the bill, and so Gracchus broke
with tradition. He demanded the assembly remove either he or the other tribune.
Octavius, from office. Naturally, the assembly deposed Octavius and the bill passed.
Although now a law, Gracchus had no guarantee his reform would be enforced once he
left power. So, he decided to renew his position- an unprecedented action. Controversy
arose during the new election and a riot ensued. Gracchus and many of his supporters
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were killed in the turmoil; his agrarian reforms would not be fully enforced,

This

incident, however, sparked a century of turmoil that transformed Rome from Republic to
Empire. By mobilizing the populace in open rejection of the Senate’s will and exploiting
12

its full potential. Gracchus set a dangerous precedent for others to utilize.
A decade later Gaius Gracchus. Tiberius’ younger brother, ascended to the
tribuneship and took up the struggle of the people in his place. He reenacted the agrarian
reforms of his brother, provided grain distributions, established colonies, and made
knights eligible to serve as jurors, whereas previously only senators had been allowed to
do so. Now the Senate could not regulate provincial equestrian tax farmers, out of fear of
judicial reprisal and because of the weight equestrians held in the electorate. On top of
these refomis, the younger Gracchus brought forth a bill to enfranchise other Italians as
Roman citizens. With the support of the wealthy equestrians and an Italian citizenry
indebted to him, Gracchus would have held incredible power. That bill did not pass,
however. and the Senate finally acted out against Gracchus by ruining the prospects of
his colony in Carthage. In response, he returned to Rome to face his opponents. Chaos
13

Thus

erupted upon his return and Gaius fled in a panic, eventually committing suicide,
the second of the Gracchi died, and soon after his agrarian reforms were retracted. His
followers and supporters were arrested and executed. The two Gracchi achieved no
lasting reforms, but proved that ambitious men could rise against the Senate with
potential success.’"* There short-lived victories opened the door from others, even homo
novi(men who were the first in their families to serve in the Senate).
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Out of this period of instability came Gaius Marius, a highly talented man from a
non-Senatorial family. The Metelli, one of the most prominent families of Rome, backed
him politically because of his high potential.‘ He steadily rose through the ranks of the
cursus honorum to win the consulship for the year 107 B.C., with the prospect of raising
an army and ending the Jugurthine War in North Africa. Formerly soldiers had to be
wealthy enough to afford their own arms and served short periods on campaign. They
were conscripted by the Roman government for the defense or well being of the
Republic. But because of the land distribution situation and the traditional requirements
for army conscription, Marius turned to the urban proletariat to fill his ranks. His reforms
revolutionized Rome’s military, as people recruited on the promise of pay and plunder.
They became career soldiers rather than militia for national security. This greatly
expanded the base from which to draw recruits but placed the loyalty ofthose troops with
16

their commander, who promised to reward their service.

With his reformed army

Marius was successful in his war against Jugurtha, winning great popularity in Rome and
the love of his soldiers. In 104 B.C. with the threat of a German invasion, he was elected
consul. He went on to be elected consul for an unprecedented five consecutive years
(because of the military emergency), and successfully defeated the Cimbri and Teutones.
Decisive victories at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae made Marius the,“idol of the
,.I7

people.

He was, in effect, the Andrew Jackson of his time.

But the consequences of Marius’ military reforms were more significant, because
land was promised for the soldiers’ retirement. Finding open land, however, was already
a problem. In his sixth consulship in 100 B.C., Marius worked to allot land for his Italian
Plutarch, Gaius Marius, 3-4.
Fuller, 25-6.
Fuller, 27.
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and Roman veterans alike, in colonies similar to those established by the Gracchi. The
Roman veterans and Senate were upset by this notion of equality, and a coup d’etat was
attempted against Marius. Disorder broke out, and Marius decided to leave Italy for
safety in Asia. So with Marius away,the tribune Livius Drusus took up the veterans’
cause in 91 B.C. He had plans to enfranchise the Italians and expand the Senate, but was
assassinated before his laws could come to fruition. With another champion of their
cause eliminated, the Italians finally withdrew from the Roman alliance promising to,
18

‘ malce war on them [the Romans] to the best of their ability,

They planned to destroy

the city in retribution for its ingratitude. This Social War, as it has been termed, ensued
for the next decade, and nearly destroyed the Roman state.
The Social War resulted in citizenship being granted to all Italian communities,
except for the Samnites who fought until they were destroyed. In the war a great deal of
Romans lost their lives, and the Senate recalled Marius to suppress the revolution. One of
his lieutenants, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, rose to high prominence in this war as well.
While Rome was busy fighting its former allies, Mithridates VI of Pontus took the
opportunity to conquer Roman provinces in the East. Sulla won the appointment to fight
Mithridates, but Marius wanted the opportunity to return to greatness. He was a far better
general than politician, and believed that victory in this war would restore the people s
19

love for him.

Marius bribed his way into taking the command, but Sulla responded by

marching his loyal army into Rome and declaring Marius an enemy of the state. Marius
escaped, and while Sulla headed eastward to face Mithridates he allied with the consul
Lucius Cornelius Cinna. Together the two marched on Rome with their combined armies
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and claimed power over the city. They began executing their enemies and associates on a
mass scale- ‘‘merciless killing, decapitation of men already dead, and exhibition of the
20

This

results to create fear or horror or a sacrilegious spectacle,” as Appian puts it.

rampage instilled terror in the Roman people, but a month after returning, Marius was
found dead in his bed. in his seventh consulship.
For the next few years Cinna maintained order in Rome while Sulla retook
Greece, invaded Asia, and forced Mithridates into peace negotiations. From his victory
he won fame, wealth, and thoroughly indulged his troops, tying their loyalty to him
further. Sulla prepared to return home after this promising to restore order and punish
those who fought against him, Cinna responded by levying an army, but was killed by his
21

soldiers in a mutiny,

Sulla then adveinced on Rome and defeated his opposition.

including Gains Marius the Younger, who committed suicide.
Finally, Sulla occupied Rome. To root out his opposition, he began posting the
22

names of unrepentant Cinnans who could be killed with impunity for a reward,

This

unprecedented action threw Rome into a state of terror, and bounty-hunters combed the
city and countryside for the proscribed. In the end, Appian claims, sixteen-hundred
23

knights and forty senators, among others, will killed in the proscriptions,

He declared

himself dictator, and set about reforming the Roman state by expanding the Senate,
increasing its power, and decreasing the power of the tribune. Sulla resigned his post as
dictator after two years, served as consul for the two years after that, and retired from
public life. His reforms and constitution would be largely dismantled only eight years
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after his death."** Thus Sulla’s march on Rome reign as dictator had little lasting effect.
save that it gave precedence to the actions of the years to come.
When Sulla died in 78 B.C., Rome had been in turmoil for almost sixty years, and
another forty remained until lasting peace would be restored. Sulla even proscribed the
young Julius Caesar when he refused to divorce Cinna’s daughter. Luckily for Caesar, he
was saved from execution by intervention of the Vestal Virgins and two of Sulla's closest
allies. Sulla pardoned him reluctantly, saying with foresight,“Very well then, you win!
fake him! But never forget that the man whom you want me to spare will one day prove
the ruin of the party which you and I have so long defended. There are many Mariuses in
,,25

this fellow Caesar.

This was the strife and chaos into which Gains Julius Caesar was bom on July 13,
100 B.C. His father shared the same name, his mother was Aurelia Cotta. His father s
family, the Julii, were one of the original patrician families, allegedly descended from
26

ancient kings and Venus.

Though his family was not particularly wealthy its patrician

status gave him some respect, along with its noble ancestry. In modem American terms,
he would be descended from an early president and a Civil War hero, with no one in his
family rising above the House of Representatives for some time. His father achieved the
rank of praetor in 92 BC, but died when Caesar was only fifteen years old. This was the
highest rank any Caesar had achieved for a long time, unless Sextus Caesar, who took the
27

consulship in 91 BC, was his uncle.

So while his ancestry was prestigious, he did not
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have the name recognition or nepotistic relatives to bring him into politics. He would
have to earn his position.
Caesar was tutored by Marcus Antonius Gnipho, a former Gallic slave educated at
28

Alexandria and a master of both Greek and Latin works and rhetoric,

This education

would prove invaluable to Caesar, whose intellect and rhetorical ability gave him a
distinct advantage from a young age. It can also be assumed that he was well trained in
fencing and riding, as was customary for children of his class. His physical, mental, and
rhetorical training would have been the best available, as his father was a Senator.
Furthermore, he would have planned to go into politics and therefore needed expertise in
29

all practical fields of learning.
Caesar was enrolled as a priest of Jupiter(flamen Dialis) at the age of sixteen, and
married Cinna's daughter Cornelia two years later. Had Sulla not returned and stripped
him of his priesthood, Caesar could never have taken part in military action, severely
limiting his political prospects.^^ However, Gelzer believes that the ambitious Caesar
31

would have found ways around those constraints,

Following Sulla’s pardon, Caesar

traveled to Asia as an officer in the army of Marcus Minucius Thermus.
In Asia he stood out as a soldier, earning the corona civica for bravery in the
32

attack on Mytilene.

This was the highest military decoration available to a Roman and

commanded enormous respect. After this he fought against the Cilician Pirates, and left
for Rome following Sulla’s abdication. He entered the world of politics upon his return
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by prosecuting in several notable court cases, including an ex-consul. This was a
customary way of gaining fame for young politicians, and Caesar performed
exceptionally.
He returned to the East at the age of twenty-five to be schooled at Rhodes by the
33

legendary rhetorician Apollonius Molon.

On his way there, however, he was kidnapped

by Cicilian pirates. After his ransom was paid, Caesar raised a small navy and captured
the pirates. He summarily crucified them all, on his own initiative and without orders
34

from the governor of Asia Minor.

Even at this early age he showed his audacity and his

disregard for authority. At the same time, he cut the throats ofthe pirates before
crucifixion, as a sign of his mercy. From there Caesar was employed in fighting the
pirates once more, but was recalled to Rome after being appointed to the College of the
Pontifices.
Caesar then entered the cursus honorum with his appointment as military tribune,
and a few years later won election as quaestor (in 69 B.C.)^^ About this same time he
gave a eulogy for his aunt Julia, the wife of Gaius Marius, in which he praised her, as
well as her and thereby his own ancestry. This high profile public funeral was another
opportunity for Caesar to stand out in the eyes of the people. Unfortunately, his wife
Cornelia also died soon after this, leaving him with Julia, his only legitimate child. Not
long after her death he married Pompeia,the granddaughter of Sulla.
Following his quaestorship Caesar was appointed curule aedile, in which he
maintained the public works and order in the city, as well as throwing celebrations and
games. He spent lavishly, going deeply into debt but winning popular favor in the
Suetonius, Caesar, 4.
Gelzer, 24.
Gelzer, 31.
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process. His colleague at this post was Marcus Calpumius Bibulus, who would later be
his co-consul. In both cases Caesar outshined Bibulus. This same year, however, was
that of the First Catilinarian Conspiracy, in which Lucius Segius Catilina along with two
disqualified consuls launched two failed attempts at assassinating the new consuls.
Caesar was implicated in this plot, most likely as a result of political propaganda that
came out during his run for the consulship a several years later. One of the prospective
victims of the conspiracy was his cousin, Lucius Aurelius Cotta, so Caesar’s involvement
36

is unlikely, though not entirely implausible.

He began working with Marcus Licinius

Crassus. another member of the populares, or people’s party, about 63 B.C., in
supporting a land bill for veterans. He also received publicity by prosecuting many
former Sullans during his terms as aedile and praetor. This office was not of the most
extreme importeince, but Caesar used it well to secure his position in future campaigns.
Next, Caesar worked tirelessly to secure the position ofPontifex Maximus, the
highest religious position in Rome. Although this honor was normally reserved for older
and more experienced men, generally former consuls, Caesar excessively bribed the
37

electorate and won the position- a lifetime appointment,

Meanwhile, Cataline planned

and attempted to execute another plot against the state, this one larger than the first. The
attempted assassination of Marcus Tullius Cicero was foiled, and eventually Catline and
his supporters were arrested and sentenced to death. Another coup had been prevented,
but Caesar was again implicated. Luckily for Caesar, he was vindicated in part by his
actions in prosecuting the Catilinarians and in part by Cicero’s testimony, and so escaped
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accusation without damage to his reputation. Consequently, he ran for and won the
praetorship for the next year.
As praetor for 62 B.C. Caesar dealt with several small crises and protected
himself from attack once more. His wife was implicated in an adultery scandal that year,
and so he divorced her. Now single once more, he set off to his propraetorship in Spain.
There he successfully suppressed rebellious tribes and fought the hordes of bandits
wreaking havoc in modern Portugal. His victories in Spain brought him both wealth and
popularity in Rome, where he planned to run for the consulship in 59 B.C. at the
minimum age of forty-one. He also competently dealt with the civil administration of this
province. Unfortunately he was unable to hold a triumph for his Spanish successes, as he
38

had planned, but won the consulship anyway.
To achieve this, he masterfully reconciled Crassus with Pompey(Gnaeus
Pompeius Vlagnus): the leading hero of the day. The two were in contention for the
leading position in Rome,and Pompey held the upper hand. But Caesar made them see
that by working together with him, as consul, they could achieve their goals without
support from the Senate. Of course, at this point neither understood the depth of Caesar’s
ambition or political genius. He was their younger with much less clout, and did not
39

appear a threat in their maneuvers for power.

Caesar had already aligned himself with

Crassus, and so cemented his relationship with Pompey by giving his daughter Julia in
marriage. Together, the three formed what has been termed the “First Triumvirate,’ and
set about fulfilling their political ambitions. What began as a transactional relationship
between the three turned into an alliance that transformed Rome.
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As consul Caesar made several popular reforms, including new agrarian laws
providing land for the poor and curbing the corrupt tax farming ofthe provinces. These
reforms and others met with hostility from his co-consul Bibulus and the Senatorial
majority, but he found ways around their dissent and instituted his policies. Caesar almost
overstepped his boundaries, however, but secured his proconsulship in Gaul and
Illyricum for the next five years through the efforts of the Triumvirate. This
governorship, in effect, protected him from prosecution by his enemies, and he set out to
40

win greater fame and glory.
Caesar served as proconsul of Gaul for ten years, in which time he enjoyed
amazing success and secured his reputation as one of the finest generals in history. He
invaded Britain, defeated Germanic tribes, and suppressed revolution in Gaul. His
military success culminated at Alesia, where he outmaneuvered an enormous united
Gallic anny. The conquest of Gaul brought not only glory to Rome, but to himself; along
with wealth and fiercely loyal troops. His name became legend, and Caesar now
surpassed Pompey as the greatest threat to the Roman oligarchy.
Through his alliance with Pompey and Crassus had secured his position in Gaul
for so long while keeping a close eye on proceedings in Rome. But his enemies
maneuvered against him all the same, seeking his recall for trial on a variety of charges.
At the same time they weakened his relationship with Pompey, which proved even easier
after Julia’s death in 55 B.C."^' Crassus died in battle against Parthia in 57 B.C., and so
the Triumvirate fell to pieces. Caesar would remain a popularis, as always, and Pompey
became the champion of the optimate, or Senatorial, party. Due to the fact that the Senate
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refused to allow him to run for the consulship from abroad and with the threat of his
enemies in Rome, Caesar was forced to march on Rome and precipitate the Civil War or
accept the end of his career. He took his chances, crossing the Rubicon and invading Italy
„42

saying, “the die is cast.

From then on Rome descended into yet another Civil War in the year 49 B.C.
First Caesar defeated Pompey’s forces in Spain, and then headed East to face Pompey
himself. He was nearly destroyed at Dyrrachium, but survived when Pompey failed to
43

follow up.

In consequence, Caesar was able to maneuver and defeat Pompey personally

on the field at Pharsalus in Greece, in 48 B.C. From there Pompey fled to Egypt where
he was killed. Caesar spent the next three years flghting off the remaining Pompeian
forces in Africa and Spain, finally crushing them at Munda in 45 B.C.
All the while, he had kept close contact with those in Rome. Most of his
opposition fled to Greece with Pompey, so that during the Civil War he had been
declared dictator. He relinquished that office, however, and held the consulship three
times between the years 48 and 45 B.C. Although he was not always present, he
controlled Rome through his agents and popular support. Because he had defeated his
enemies and stood without opposition, Caesar did not proscribe Pompey’s followers,

as

Marius, Cinna, and Sulla had to their rivals. Instead, he repatriated them in hopes of
averting the bloodshed that chai'acterized the recent past. He was declared Dictator
Perpetuus by the people of Rome following his return from Munda, giving him virtual
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absolute power for life. Accepting this position, of course, was tantamount to accepting a
,,44

throne; especially in the eyes of the Senate. He was,“master of Rome and the empire.
As dictator, Caesar instituted many popular and logical reforms, as well as
throwing celebrations and holding four triumphs for himself. Extravagant building
projects were undertaken for the greatness of Rome, and it appeared Caesar’s reign would
usher in a new era. But it was to be short lived. His disregard for the traditions and rights
of the Senate, such as appointing magistrates years in advance instead of holding
elections, enraged the old members of the optimate party. He had accepted divinity and
appeared like a king of old, so they conspired against him. On the Ides of March,44 B.C.,
45

Brutus, Cassius, and the others famously murdered Caesar in a meeting of the Senate.
Although the dictator was dead, another decade of civil war ensued. It ended with the
accession of Octavian, Caesar’s nephew and heir, to the emperorship. The Republic

never

returned, as his assassins had hoped.
Such was the life of Gaius Julius Caesar. The chaotic world into which he was
bom demanded extraordinary leaders. There were several such men with whom he
competed for power; namely Pompey, Cicero, and Cato. Their names, along with Sulla,
Marius, and Cimia, define this revolutionary era in Roman history. But Caesar surpassed
them all in fame and reputation. Only through betrayal by those he had forgiven was
Caesar taken from power.
I will dedicate the rest of this work to examining specific instances in Caesar s
career, thereby exposing the depth of his expertise as a leader. The achievements
highlighted in this chapter came not by chance or luck, but by his determination and
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ability. As previously mentioned, Caesar did not come from a powerful dynasty like the
46

Metelli or Claudii.

He certainly had advantages, but his rise required crucial alliances

with the wealthy, like Crassus; the famous, like Pompey; and many other subordinate
agents. His character, personal qualities, and skills explain how he defeated his enemies
at every turn. Through open action and subtle maneuvering, Caesar turned almost every
situation to his advantage. He was a leader in the truest sense, and by his innate
leadership capacity rose above the talented and noble competition he faced. Caesar not
only tits the criteria set forth by modem leadership theory, he defined it. Two thousand
years later, the most effective leaders exhibit his qualities.
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Chapter 3
Caesar’s Early Political Career
Early in his career Caesar demonstrates the qualities necessary for effective
leadership. Caesar held nobilis status, as an ancestor of his had held the consulship
centuries ago. But his family lacked the notoriety ofthose families continually winning
the highest office, leaving him at a disadvantage politically. Nonetheless, he managed to
exceed his family’s unremarkable standing because of his impressive personal
characteristics and talents. Three major achievements, along with many other smaller
ones, evince his superior political prowess. First, his election to the college of the
pontifices and ascension to pontifex maximus exhibit his great confidence, his audacity,
and his understanding of the importance ofimage. Secondly, after winning the
consulship, Caesar drove his co-consul Bibulus into seclusion and out of the political
spotlight. Achieving this required a strategic alliance with Pompey and Crassus, two of
the most powerful men of the day. He utilized all of his political faculties to create this
coalition, and in doing so effectively made himself sole executive in Rome. Finally,
Caesar secured his position as proconsul of Gaul, which proved extremely profitable, and
escaped prosecution by the nobility which he offended as consul. Caesar succeeded in
these and many other instances in his early career, shaping his public persona and
demonstrating his leadership capacity. As a result, he emerged as a young but serious
contender for power in Rome. Following Sulla’s demise, the position of first man of the
empire remained open. At this point Pompey stood as frontrunner to assume that position.
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as a celebrated war hero, followed by Crassus because of his great wealth. Through
strategic maneuvers in this first part of his career, however, Caesar rose to their levels of
prominence
The Roman nobility continually perpetuated its hold on the state by regulating
who entered its ranks. Bribery and corruption secured positions for nobles and their
allies, forcing newcomers to befriend those already in power. Between the years 80 B.C.
and 50 B.C., seventy-five percent of the consuls had a father or grandfather who had been
consul.' Caesar, therefore, needed powerful allies if he intended to rise above the
praerorship: the highest office held by his father. But Sulla’s former friends and allies
dominated the government after his death, while the majority of Marians were dead or in
exile. So Caesar, as Marius’ nephew, faced a serious obstacle in his pursuit of higher
office.
Gaining membership in one ofthe religious colleges, however, offered

a means

for infiltrating the highest class. Unfortunately, the great consular families continually
dominated these bodies.^ Because Sulla had transferred priestly elections from the
people to the members of the colleges themselves, Caesar’s hopes lay with those Sullan
members. To Caesar’s advantage, his cousin, the recently deceased Gains Cotta, had been
a member of the college of the pontifices. Also, his recent prosecution of Gnaeus
Cornelius Dolabella, a former consul, distinguished him as an orator. Although he lost the
case, Cicero remarked of his performance,“Do you know any man who, even if he has
concentrated on the art of oratory to the exclusion of all else, can speak better than
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Caesar?

On top of this he had won the Corona Civica for saving a fellow Roman in

battle years earlier, one of the highest military honors in the Roman state. With this
reputation, his cousinly connection, and his congenial character, Caesar won cooption
into the college in 73 B.C.
This significant feat placed Caesar in a highly esteemed body with some ofthe
most powerful men of the day, strengthening his public image significantly. He could
now utilize his new prestige and connections in pursuit of higher offices as an accepted
member of the nobility.** The importance of this membership cannot be overstated,
because it affiliated him with the ruling class. He could now look to his more powerful
peers for sponsorship in future elections - a distinct advantage in this early stage of his
career.
In the following years Caesar won appointment as a military tribune and then
election to the quaestorship. He served proficiently in both positions, but lost his Aunt
Julia in 69 B.C. At her funeral he made a point to stress her, and thereby his own, noble
descent from Venus and the ancient kings. Her funeral, as Marius’ widow, drew great
attention, allowing Caesar to publicize his notable ancestry and improve his public image.
His wife Cornelia died that same year, breaking his tie with the unsavory Cinna. As a
widower, the prospect of a new wife offered Caesar the opportunity to form a new marital
connection with the elite. With this in mind, he married Sulla’s granddaughter Pompeia
in 67 B.C. This marriage could not be more propitious, because it distanced him from the
populares and associated him further with Sulla’s old allies. Caesar required these
connections in order to further his career.
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That same year, Caesar won election as Curator of the Appian Way. Although he
received some recognition for successful administration, it does not compare to the fame
he gained later as curule aedile. The curule aediles held several responsibilities within
the city, including the promotion of games for holidays. As curule aedile for 65 B.C.,
Caesar saw' the opportunity to win great popularity and threw extravagant celebrations at
his owm expense. The gladiatorial games he organized in honor of his father were
particularly impressive. Also, he restored the monuments to Marius’ victories throughout
tile city, which Sulla had removed. In doing so he returned glory to a hero of the empire,
and won further love from the people. He overshadowed his peer in this office, Marcus
Calpumius Bibulus. so much so that Bibulus admitted, “the combined generosity of
himself and Caesar was attributed to Caesar alone.

Caesar incurred extreme debt to

win public affection in these offices, but believed that the popular support he gained
promised the means to repay his lenders in the future. As Plutarch writes,“many people
thought that he was purchasing a moment’s brief fame at an enormous price, whereas in
„6

reality he was buying the greatest place in the world at inconsiderable expense,

These

early actions evince Caesar’s unshakable confidence in his abilities and his future. The
financial risks he took seemed excessive to others, but Caesar saw the larger picture. He
understood the mindset of the populace, and knew that the political capital gained from
his actions far outweighed the monetary debt he sustained in the process.
By employing these policies Caesar emerged as a popular politician. Pursuing
politics as an optimate w'ould have placed Caesar in serious competition with members of
far more illustrious families, regardless of their political prowess. He probably would
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have advanced to the consulship eventually by this route, but he could never have truly
emerged as the leader of the party. The optimates sought to keep the oligarchy in place,
and therefore shared power amongst themselves. The populahs via offered a greater and
faster road to power.^ Pompey stood, at the moment, on the verge of becoming the first
man in Rome because of his great popular support as well. The decay of the oligarchic
system made popular politicians potent once more; the Gracchi proved this eighty years
earlier. Gains Marius again proved it barely two decades before this point. As a popular
leader, Caesar’s potential increased substantially, but required other popular allies to
effectively oppose the establishment.
The year 63 B.C. brought great opportunity for Caesar. First, he worked with the
popular tribune, Publius Servilius Rullus, to pass a bill which would buy up and allocate
land for the poor and veterans. The bill was also supported by Marcus Licenius Crassus,
considered the wealthiest man in Rome. Cicero, as consul, blocked the bill. But this
collaboration aligned Caesar with Crassus,(although the two were already linked to a
small extent), and served to unite them in the future.^ Despite his failure with this bill,
the value of siding with Crassus was not diminished. Caesar also found allies in the
popular tribunes.
Later that year, the tribune Titus Labienus proposed a bill restoring priestly
elections to the people. Caesar supported the bill and it passed; conveniently, considering
the circumstances. ^ The pontifex maximus, Quintus Metellus Pius, had recently passed
away and left his seat open. This position, the highest religious office in Rome, was
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reserved for the most highly respected men of the Roman state, namely great ex-consuls.
Caesar was only thirty-seven years old and a mere candidate for the praetorship. His
opponents, both ex-consuls, outweighed him in reputation and rank. But Caesar refused
10

to back down, even when his competitor Catalus tried to pay him off.

With the election

now public, Caesar began bribing the electorate. He took out enormous loans; so great
II

that Suetonius says he told his mother if he lost the election he would not return at all.
Through extensive bribery he won the election overwhelmingly, and rose to unheard of
prominence at a young age. Caesar now established himself as a force in Roman politics.
The ponfifex maximus enjoyed a lifetime term. The position was not only
sacrosanct and inviolable: it gave Caesar a prominent home in the city and improved his
image considerably. His dignitas, or dignity, rose immeasurably with this title as well.
Moreover. Caesar's pursuit of this office reveals his ambition and sheer audacity. He
may never have had the chance to take this office again, and the opportunity it presented
stood too high. By borrowing so heavily and disregarding tradition, Caesar risked his
12

future in politics on a single election.

He rejected the payofffrom Catalus and

exhausted his resources to ensure his victory. The election reveals the depth of his selfconfidence and ambition, and they do not betray him. More importantly, his willingness
to bypass institutional practice indicates his potential as a transformational, and even
revolutionary, leader.
Following his installment as pontifex maximus, a scandal broke out in Rome that
threatened the stability of the city. Lucius Sergius Cataline lost his bid for the consulship
that same year, and conspired with several others to overthrow the government. He and
Gelzer, 47.
Suetonius,
Meier, 161.

13.
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his followers planned to form an army of commoners, assassinate the consul Cicero, and
capture the city. As their insurgency took shape and word spread of the conspiracy,
Cataline fled to join his army; but five lead conspirators were arrested for treason. Both
Crassus and Caesar were accused of involvement in the plot as well, but neither was
formally brought to trial. The attempted coup posed a severe danger to order in the city.
The five men were found guilty, and most advocated the death penalty in order to prevent
further uprising. As the recently elected praetor for the coming year, Caesar gave his
opinion of the case. He spoke with eloquence and condemned the men, but argued for
life-imprisonment over death. He justified this assertion by claiming that imposition of
the death penalty left the Senate, especially Cicero, open to future prosecution.
Shrewdly, Caesar managed to agree with the leading senators while opposing them at the
same time. In arguing against the death penalty, he subtly challenged their authority on
the matter. After all, life-imprisonment could be considered worse than death. His
speech impressed many and even won significant support for his cause. Nonetheless,
Marcus Fortius Cato the Younger, soon to be his most bitter enemy, managed to swing
the Senate in favor of death. The five conspirators were summarily executed.
Cato won the day, but Caesar’s speech had its impact. Again he proved himself a
most compelling orator, even with the disadvantage of arguing against the obvious
consensus. His prolific rhetoric once more made him famous, and his compassion for the
accused improved his pubic image. Although he lost this round with Cato, Caesar showed
the elite that he was now a substantial force in politics. He had the capacity to compete
with the old guard.
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As praetor in 62 B.C., Caesar takes only two notable actions. Rome was in the
position of overseeing trials in subsidiary and tributary territories. In one such case, he
chose to defend a Numidian nobleman on trial for assaulting a prince. The court found in
favor of the prosecution, but Caesar refused to betray his duty as this man’s host. He
protected the man and smuggled him out of the country when he left for his
propraetorship in Spain. This action won respect for Caesar as a patron, because of the
14

obligation he fulfilled to his client.

Relationships such as this defined a man’s

reputation, or dignitas, according to Roman tradition. Therefore, Caesar won admiration
for his loyalty and improved his image, although modem standards consider such actions
unethical.
I'he other incident that year involved a scandal at a women’s religious festival, the
Bona Dea. Publius Clodius Pulcher, another nobleman, visited Caesar’s house disguised
as a women, puiportedly to sleep with Caesar’s wife. The Senate demanded he be
prosecuted, but bribery secured his acquittal. Caesar took no part in the trial, but divorced
Pompeia all the same. When confronted about this decision, Caesar replied, I cannot
15

have members of my household accused or even suspected,

In refusing to testify

against his wife, Caesar shows his mercy and respect. Ruining her reputation was below
him, and he wanted no part in it. By the same token, suspicion of her adultery hurt his
pride, and divorce without judicial conviction revealed his high personal standards.
Caesar acted with admirable poise, improving his image despite the unpleasant situation.
In 61 B.C. Caesar assumed the governorship of Further Spain. Within this
province, the area of Lusitania,(modem Portugal), had yet to feel the full force of Roman
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authority. Caesar set about suppressing unruly tribes and captured a great deal of plunder,
much of which he gave to his soldiers. In response they hailed him imperator, basically
16

'‘general.” - the supreme sign of respect from the army,

The Senate voted him a

triumph in recognition of his success. On top of this, Caesar also managed the civil
administration of the province well and settled the debt problem there.
His proficient military and civil administration in Spain reveals Caesar’s abilities
even farther. In his first action as a true military leader, he pacifies the uncivilized part of
his province and makes it safe for Roman administration. After the campaigning season,
he runs the province with great success. This governorship proves his capability in both
arenas on a larger scale, and gives him the recognition necessary to vie for the
consulship. Even the Senators, many of whom hated him at this point, acknowledged his
adept administration. As Gelzer writes,“He conducted affairs like a bom general and
ruler, but never lost himself in this activity on the periphery of the Empire, what mattered
„17

was always its effect on Rome,

In Rome, however, Caesar faced a problem. Time

constraints prevented him from running for the consulship and holding his triumph,
because once he entered the city to run for the election his military position became null.
Typically, Cato blocked his request to run in abstenia. Although a triumph would have
added to his popularity and personal glory, Caesar chose to run

for office. The power of

the consulship was too attractive for a man with his ambition.
Caesar entered the race for consulship in alliance with Lucius Lucceius and
against Bibulus, his former co-aedile. Bibulus held the support ofthe high nobility, as a
block to Caesar should he win the election. Pompey,the leading hero in Rome following
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his Eastern victories, supported both Caesar and Lucceius. Caesar had endeared himself
to Pompey earlier by supporting the Lex Manilla, a bill benefiting Pompey’s veterans
18

from the Mithridatic War.

The Senate had long feared Pompey might try to take power,

as Marius, Cinna, and Sulla had following their great military victories. To prevent this,
they continually opposed his policies. Seeking to repay his debt and earn future favor,
Pompey backed Caesar for the consulship through his enormous influence.*^ Although
Pompey was his chief competition for power, Crassus also backed Caesar. He was
already friends with Caesar from their earlier partnerships, and so agreed to back him
monetarily. Through Pompey’s support, Crassus’ donations, and his own impressive
retinue, Caesar won the first seat of the consulship. Unfortunately, Bibulus took the
second. As time soon proved, however, Bibulus was no match for Caesar’s superior
political prowess.
Following his victory, Caesar began working to unite both Crassus and Pompey
with himself These three men posed the greatest threat to the oligarchy, and by working
together could undermine its power substantially. Caesar needed their support to ensure
he received a good province after his consulship; Pompey needed his veteran s bills
20

passed; and Crassus wanted repayment for the tax farmers of Asia,

Caesar, as consul.

stood as the front man for this “triumvirate,” and the three planned to use their combined
influence to achieve their goals. At this point, Caesar was the lowest member of the
triumvirate. He lacked the reputation and wealth of his peers, but overcame those
shortcomings With his superior leadership ability.^* The triumvirate represents a masterful
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political maneuver by Caesar. By forming this propitious alliances and exploiting it.
Caesar overcame what he lacked in clout or stature. Together, the three controlled
Roman politics.
Caesar’s achieved more than anyone expected in his consulship, which he
assumed in 59 B.C. To reach his goals, he enlisted the service of several other
magistrates in critical positions. Most notably, he recruited the praetors Cornelius
Lentulus Spinther and Quintus Fufius Calenus to his side, as well as the popular tribune
22

Publius Vatinius,(who he had to bribe extensively),

Collaboration with men such as

these gave him a distinct advantage in combating Senatorial opposition, as the tribunes
veto power always threatened his enemies’ proposals. The praetors,(as the second
highest magistrates), gave further weight to his proposals through their support. Beyond
these partnerships, Caesar took care to respect the traditions of his office. He continually
took the auspices, regardless of their impracticality, as custom dictated. His tribune
Vatinius, however, promised to ignore them, so that the Senate could no longer use bad
23

auspices as an excuse for quashing a bill.

By the same token, he could observe them

when they portended in Caesar’s advantage. Thereby, Caesar used the auspices for his
benefit and crippled one of the Senate’s methods of opposition simultaneously.
He acted with a fa?ade of benevolence towards his colleague and the Senate,
maintaining the tradition of alternating leadership by the month with Bibulus and
conferring with top ex-consuls. But he also mandated the publishing of Senate and
assembly hearings, so that everyone knew,(or had the opportunity to learn), the political
issues of the day. And so Caesar set forth his first great reform, a land bill allocating land
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to Pompey’s veterans. It proposed the formation of a commission, which employed the
bounty from Pompey’s wars to procure land in the countryside at an equitably appraised
price. The land then went to the former soldiers, rewarding them for service on behalf of
Rome. To prevent argument against the bill, Caesar recused himselffrom taking place on
that commission. By wording the bill so well and eliminating suspicion of his profiting
from it, Caesai' left his opponents no room to argue against it. Sulla’s similar provisions
24

acted as a precedent for this land distribution.

Only Cato stepped forward to speak

against it. and with his typical ardor attempted to kill the bill by filibuster. Caesar
responded out of necessity and arrested him.
Caesar turned to the popular assembly to pass the bill when the Senate refused to
approve it. He then released Cato from prison, as Gelzer puts it, “before he became a
mart>T.”“' Pompey summoned his veterans to Rome for the vote, and he and Crassus both
voiced their support for the bill before the assembly. Caesar left little room for
opposition, and even invited Bibulus to speak against it. Frustrated, Bibulus impudently
»26

replied. “You shall not have this law this year, not even if you all wish it.

Bibulus

obviously lacked the composure of his counterpart; and showed little tact in addressing
the assembly,(the theoretical supreme body in Rome),in this manner. Despite the
oligarchy’s opposition to the bill, everyone knew the assembly would pass it. Caesar,
Pompey, and Crassus, among others,justified it too convincingly. He successfully put
his enemies,“morally in the wrong, in his rational defense of the bill.^’ Consequently,
Bibulus resorted to direct intervention, his only option remaining.
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On the day of the vote Bibulus brought three tribunes and their guards to
intercede. Caesar’s supporters and Pompey’s veterans repulsed them, covered Bibulus in
fecal waste, and wounded several others. Caesar’s opponents withdrew in disgrace, and
the assembly passed the land bill. As a result of this incident, Bibulus went into seclusion.
From his home, he attempted to obstruct Caesar’s future acts by declaring bad omens.
28

Caesar ignored him, and the people found his feeble attempts ridiculous,

For the rest of

their terni Bibulus was incapacitated. Caesar had defeated him and proven, as he had
shown during their shared aedileship, to be the superior politician. Suetonius writes that
people parodied the situation, referring to the year as the,“Consulship of Julius and
29

Caesar,” and ignoring Bibulus’ position,

Admittedly, Bibulus was not the best man to

counter Caesar on the optimate faction’s behalf. But keep in mind he was receiving
directions from Cato and his party. His defeat signifies Caesar’s ability outsmart and
outmaneuver rivals and their backers. Intellectually, Bibulus had no chance. Caesar
understood the people and the duties of his office. He successfully prevented his image
from being tarnished while making Bibulus appear powerless. He also had the
determination to implement his policies regardless of his colleague’s objections, and
found ways to overwhelm him at every turn. Caesar was simply the better politician.
Caesar now moved forward with his agenda, pushing through a bill remitting a
third of the Asian tax-farmers’ debts, many of whom fell under Crassus’ patronage. On
top of repaying his debt to Crassus, Caesar gained support from those equestrian taxfarmers. However, he warned the equestrians against corruption and overbidding for tax
contracts in the future. Having appeased both Crassus and Pompey through his policies.
^^Michael J. G. Gray-Fow,“The Mental Breakdown of a Roman Senator: M. Calpumius Bibulus, Greece
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Caesar now needed a way to secure his alliance further. He did not worry too much about
Crassus, their friendship was old and fairly reliable. Pompey,on the other hand, was
much more powerful and less dedicated. With his needs met, he might leave the
Triumvirate to pursue his own goals.
To cement their relationship Caesar offered Pompey his daughter Julia in
marriage. Marriage, as previously mentioned, was a common method offorming political
alliances. In manying Julia, Pompey and Caesar formally united, and began working to
achieve their goals with little regard for the oligarchy.^® The two had Rome under their
control; no one had the clout to effectively oppose them. Cato and his followers were
enraged but impotent nonetheless; an open attack on either could have irreparable
consequences. But so far Caesar had overlooked the urban populace in his policies- the
very people he should have cared for as a popularis. With his popularity quite low, he
brought about an agrarian law providing twenty-thousand citizens with three or more
children with land. Cato automatically opposed it, but Caesar again removed him from
the rostrum. When the bill passed Caesar once more gained some favor in the plebiscite.
At the same time, this move benefited Caesar in another way. Caesar made this new
31

colony a reality, and so its new citizens owed him allegiance for his patronage,

This

pai-allels the relationship Caesar had with the Numidian, between benefactor and
beneficiary, and thus Caesar gains two important types of support. Caesar, however, still
had not received his province for the next year.
His ally Vatinius then brought about the lex Vatinia^ giving Caesar Ciscalpine
Gaul and Illyricum as provinces for the next five years. These territories were two of the
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best he could have hoped for; Gaul especially because of the unrest in the area.
Conquering an unruly territory, as he proved in Spain, provided both fame and wealth to
the governor. On top of those two territories, Pompey then proposed Caesar receive
Transalpine Gaul. Cato, of course, opposed these acts vehemently, but again to no avail.
Caesar now held power in two provinces for half a decade, while his position in
Transalpine Gaul had to be renewed annually. His elation in his victory later surfaced in
32

the Senate, when he boasted to his enemies about his position.
The remainder of his term as consul was rather lackluster. He passed a law
concerning the administration of provinces, which was kept even after the rise of the
33

Empire.

Through the efforts of the Triumvirs, Caesar’s father-in-law, Lucius

Calpurnius Piso, and his ally Aulus Gabinius won the consulships for the next year. With
Pompey and Crassus, his other friends as consuls, and his agents still in Rome, Caesar
maintained a presence in the city. He could go to Gaul and take up his command soon
without fear of removal. Despite the power of the Triumvirate, two of his greatest
enemies, Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus and Gains Memmius won praetorships for the
next year. They immediately set about bringing charges against Caesar, trying to
invalidate his laws. Caesar left the city before a verdict was reached, and took up his
position in Gaul.
Thus, Caesar managed to overcome his opponents and take his prized
proconsulship, through sheer determination and force of character. His strategic alliances
truly paid off for him, while his intellect and rhetoric allowed him to cripple his co-
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consul. His actions as consul made him many great enemies, but also placed him in a
propitious position. Matthias Gelzer puts its best:
‘‘Caesar’s political ventures, while always admirably serving the needs of the moment, at
the same time contained still greater possibilities for the future. In constructing his
policies he never laid a stone on which he could not build further: as a result, a
retrospective view gives the impression that everything was actually planned...as if by an
architect.
Cithers might have crumbled under pressure from the Senate and unpopularity with the
people. Caesar’s will was simply strong, and so he survived for the time being. His
future success now depended on his performance in Gaul.

34
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Chapter 4
The Gallic Wars
Caesar’s future depended not only on a successful performance in Gaul, but an
extraordinary one. Upon his departure for Gaul in early 58 B.C., he faced two major
challenges. First, he needed military glory to retain his command and expand popular
support in Rome. This required the conquest and subjugation of new lands: the best road
to wealth and fame for a Rome. Therefore, he needed to turn all of Gaul, a sizeable
ten'itory, into a legitimate province ofthe Roman Empire. Secondly, he had to contain his
enemies in Rome from abroad. His enemies had attempted to keep him from leaving for
Gaul in the first place, and continued to work against him once he was there,

To

counter them, Caesar had Pompey and Crassus, along with a network of subordinate
officers and agents. At the same time he sent plunder back to Rome and published his
accounts of the wars. The resulting popular support, combined with the efforts of his
allies, prevented Caesar’s enemies from recalling him for nearly ten years. His clout in
Rome even provided him an extension on his term, so that Caesar completely conquered
Gaul in just under a decade. In the Gallic Wars Caesar proved himself the most potent
leader of his age. Militarily, he subdued a large amount of territory and established Gaul
as a premier set of provinces. He won the indomitable loyalty of his soldiers and great
wealth. By sending dispatches and publishing his commentaries, he kept Rome informed
of his progress and turned military success into political capital. Consequently, Caesar s
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position was so great that the Senate passed a resolution,(senatus consultum ultimum),
saying he must dismiss his army in 49 B.C. To do so and return to Rome meant political
suicide, and so he went to war against the optimates?
I have divided this chapter into two sections. The first concerns Caesar’s military
career. Instead of reviewing each individual campaign chronologically, I focus on
specific instances reflecting his effectiveness as a military leader. I examine him as a
soldier, a general, and in relation to his troops. His actions in each of these capacities
reveal how his characteristics and skills produced success. In the second section I discuss
how he used the wai’s to elevate himself politically while maintaining his position as
proconsul. His tactics in this area, again, reflect his sheer ability to lead.
I
Caesar planned to embark on his conquest almost immediately following his
consulship, but an obstacle stood in his way. He lacked the authority to invade new
regions; his four legions were provided for suppressing revolts and repelling invasions.
Caesai’, as he had as consul, ignored the technicalities of his position. To begin actions
against the Helvetii, who had begun migrating westward from modem Switzerland

across

France (without encroaching on Roman territory), he claimed to be avenging the consul
they defeated in 107 B.C. On top of this, in their migration the Helvetii passed through
territory of the Aedui, a tribe closely allied to Rome. Caesar turned to a Senatorial decree
of61 B.C., which allowed the governor of Transalpine Gaul to take any action he thought
appropriate in defense of the Aedui. Cleverly, Caesar maneuvered around the restraints
of his post, attacked the Helvetii and forced them to return home. This strategy, and other
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similar ones, allowed Caesar to conquer Gaul without being formally prosecuted."* His
intellect and ambition proved superior once more.
Caesar stood out early in his career as a soldier, winning the Corona Civica for
bravery, as previously mentioned. As a general in Gaul, Caesar continued to display his
skill as a soldier. In several instances he personally entered the battle and turned the tide,
as he did against the Nervii in 57 B.C. This tribe ambushed the Romans before they
could fortify their camp, and so were not prepared for the onslaught. Caught off guard,
Caesar quickly gave orders and urged his men to battle. Most ofthe officers in the 12**^
Legion had been killed or wounded, and the entire unit risked collapsing. In the heat of
battle, Caesar rushed to the front lines and rallied the troops, fighting and issuing orders
simultaneously. As a result, the he personally turned a near defeat into a stunning victory
and virtually destroyed the Nervii.^ His courage inspired the troops and won the day with
great risk to himself, evincing his dedication and willing self-sacrifice. Furthermore, this
action, and others like it, made his army truly respect Caesar as a soldier.
Suetonius testifies to his soldierly talent, writing, “Caesar was a most skillful
swordsman and horseman, and showed surprising power of endurance.’

As general, he

could have enjoyed a higher quality of life, but Caesar was a soldier and lived like his
men. He slept on the road, working tirelessly and disregarding his own pains. As
Plutarch puts it, “there was no danger which he was not willing to face, no form of hard
work from which he excused himself... they [his troops] were amazed at the way in
»7

which he would undergo hardships.

He was known for digging trenches and building
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siege works, sleeping in the open and leading his troops on the march. He even ate
whatever his men ate. In doing so, the men respected him even more. Although their
superior, he worked like a common infantryman.
As a general, Caesar employed his intellect, determination, and rhetoric, among
other qualities, to conquer Gaul. In recruiting new troops he acted particularly
intelligently. The people of the Gallic provinces were not full Roman citizens at this
time, but hoped for suffrage following Rome’s concessions in the Social War. When he
arrived in Gaul, Caesar attracted recruits by treating those who joined his army like
Roman citizens.^ In doing so, he not only increased his military power, but made those
men eternally indebted to him. By the time he crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C., Caesar
had ten legions under his command. He had been granted four legions originally and lost
two to transfer, not to mention losses on campaign.^ This means that at least eight
legions were created by Caesar during his ten year term as governor. Obviously,
Romanized Gauls made up a significant portion of his army. They, of course, felt greater
loyalty to Caesar than Rome. Without them, Caesar’s conquest of Gaul could not have
succeeded, nor could his victory in the Civil War.
Caesar acted logically in rewarding and promoting his troops. Members of the
nobility made up the majority of higher military posts in the Roman Army, as they had
been trained to become officers from a young age. But Caesar saw that birthright did not
necessitate effective leadership; Czar Nicholas II met this reality on the battlefield in
World War 1. Instead, he chose those with talent for promotion and reward. As
Suetonius wTitcs,“He judged men by their fighting record, not by their morals or social
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position, treating them with equal severity - and equal indulgence,

When men fought

with distinction, he richly rewarded them. After great victories his troops received
bounty, and were often allowed to celebrate excessively. When they acted unruly he
punished them, though only severely when absolutely required. These fair and logical
policies not only gave the soldiers greater motivation to fight, as they would be rewarded
when due: but put people with more skill in higher positions, thereby strengthening the
army. While Caesar sometimes chose officers for political purposes, such as Cicero’s
nephew, he only placed those with talent in important positions, which he had “keen
eyes’* for.

By acting with logic and equality towards all of his troops, Caesar produced

a highly skilled and loyal army.
To inspire his men further, Caesar employed his superb rhetorical skill. After the
defeat of the Helvetii, Ariovistus and his German army approached the Romans. No one
knew whether a deal could be negotiated or war would ensue, but most expected war.
The Gauls in the area told stories of German ferocity, which threw his troops into panic
and threatened to dishearten the entire army. Caesar responded in a speech, citing Gaius
Marius’ defeat of the German Teutoni and Cimbri as proof that the Romans were superior
fighters. Furthermore, he made reference to other instances where the Helvetii, recently
defeated by Caesar, had themselves repelled German advances. He claimed that the
reason the Gauls feared the Germans stemmed from a defeat following a prolonged war,
which Ariovistus capitalized on. He then challenged the honor of his army, and said he
would advance alone with the 10^*^ Legion if necessary, because of its unquestionable

Suetonius, Caesar,65.
Gelzer, 124.

51

12

loyalty.

This speech completely changed the morale ofthe troops. The 10*’^ Legion

thanked Caesar for his faith in it, while the others felt shame for his doubt in them. When
negotiations fell through war ensued, but the revitalized Romans defeated the Germans in
battle. Caesar saved his army from losing spirit through historical allusion combined with
shame. Although this speech was not recorded verbatim, his usual eloquence can be
inferred. Gelzer writes,‘‘At such decisive moments an overwhelming power radiated
from his deliberate calm and unshakable confidence,

13

Orations, such as this, boosted

the morale of his men whenever great danger approached. Caesar’s rhetorical skill
complemented his relationship with his armies.
Consequently, he became their motivation in battle; they wanted his approval and
respect. When Titus Labienus, one of Caesar’s top lieutenants, engaged Camulogenus
and the Aulerci without the proconsul, he encouraged the men to fight as if Caesar
14

himself were there.

The soldiers responded by rallying and defeating Camulogenus.

Loyalty even drove these me to fight while wounded, as Gaius Acilius did after losing a
15

hand in battle.

These instances, and many similar ones, reveal depth of dedication

Caesar’s soldiers felt to him. Suetonius records that Caesar’s men never mutinied during
16

his ten year teiTn in Gaul.

They fought in dire circumstances and against numerically

superior enemies many times, always trusting Caesar to lead them to victory. Arthur, the
Duke of Wellington, once said he, “considered Napoleon’s presence in the field equal to
»17

forty thousand men.

In this capacity, Julius Caesar was the Napoleon of his day.

12

Caesar, BG, I, 39-41.
Gelzer, 1 10-111.
14
Cuff, 33; Caesar, 62.
Suetonius, Caesar,68.
16
Suetonius, Caesar, 69.
17
Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, quoted in Stanhope, Conversations with Wellington, 1888, 81,
quoted in John Bartlett, Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations(Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. 1955), 400.

52

The year 52 B.C. tested both the loyalty of his armies and Caesar’s expertise as a
strategist. The Roman conquest made the tribes realize their joint heritages, and a notion
18

of Gallic nationalism emerged,

Having learned of political turmoil in Rome,several

defiant Gallic tribes revolted. Eventually, the revolution spread and a united Gallic force
formed; many of Rome’s oldest allies betrayed her. The situation was dire; the past
seven years’ success would be destroyed if this revolution succeeded. Caesar
maneuvered against Vercingetorix, chief of the Arvemi, who constantly attempted to
break his supply lines and disillusion the Romans through guerrilla warfare. He
coimtered the Gaul’s moves, and besieged the important city of Avaricum. His soldiers
risked starvation due to compromised supply lines, but refused Caesar’s offer to end the
19

siege with determination,

The Romans took the city and slaughtered the inhabitants.

hoping this cruelty might send a message to the Gauls.
The effect of this victory, however, was reversed at Gergovia. Caesar besieged
the city, hoping to take Vercingetorix. In a sortie he lost nearly seven hundred men and
forty-six centurions(company commanders), making it one of his worst losses of the
20

wars.

As a result even more tribes revolted, including the Aedui, and Vercingetorix

was declared supreme commander of the united Gallic army. Caesar decided to unite his
force with the rest of his army under Titus Labienus, who had been operating near
modem Paris. Once their forces reunited, Caesar repelled a Gallic attack and
Vercingetorix retreated to the fortress of Alesia. Caesar pursued and laid siege to the
fortress, so Vercingetorix sent his cavalry to recruit more troops from the other tribes and
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break the siege.

He planned to wedge the Romans between Alesia and a relieving

army. Caesar countered the Gallic strategic brilliantly.
He began digging trenches, moats, and erecting palisades around Alesia and on
each side of his army. The Romans built twenty-three forts and divided their forces into
22

eight camps, which were protected by the defenses constructed,

Caesar sent his cavalry

to forage as much as possible, in preparation for the Gallic relief army. Modem scholars
estimate Caesar’s army numbered between fifty and fifty-five thousand men, while
Vercingetorix’s army inside Alesia numbered roughly eighty thousand. The Gallic relief
army is believed to be as large as two-hundred and forty thousand infantry, plus cavalry,
23

giving the combined Gallic army over three-hundred and thirty thousand men.

Once

that enormous force arrived the Gauls began their attack. The first assault failed, as did a
second night assault. Roman discipline, siege weaponry, and strategy won in both cases.
But the third assault brought almost disastrous results for Caesar.
After surveying the situation, the Gauls found a weak point in the Roman
defenses. Early one morning, they sent six-thousand “picked men” under one of their top
24

generals to attack this position.

They nearly broke through, and Caesar reinforced the

position twice. Finally, he brought more reinforcements under his personal command into
the battle. Evidently, he wore a special cloak to distinguish himself, which enlivened the
25

troops and halted the Gallic advance.

Simultaneously, he sent cavalry forces around the

Gauls and forced them to flee. The battle was won, and Vercingetorix taken prisoner. He
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gave each of his soldiers a captured enemy as a slave, on top of rewarding them with
plunder. Then, he used the leverage of his new prisoners to force the Aedui and Arvemi
26

into submission once more.

Although there were a few minor uprisings after Alesia,
27

Roman control was established in Gaul for the next five centuries.

His brilliance as a

tactician suppressed the Gallic Revolution.
Alesia was Caesar’s crowning achievement as governor of Gaul, and he and his
men reaped the benefits in fame and wealth. In defeating the uprising, he gained a highly
profitable market for the empire. Outnumbered roughly six-to-one and surrounded; only
a general of Caesar’s caliber could have devised such an audacious plan for victory. His
tactical intelligence and determination made this victory possible. Here, like his attack
on Ariovistus and so many others, he took advantage of an opportunity despite serious
28

risks, and won glory for himself, his army, and Rome,

But military conquest is only

one aspect of Caesar’s career in Gaul. His victories provided the leverage necessary to
retain and improve his political position in Rome.

II
In the Roman Republic, successful military operations translated into enormous
political capital. From Scipio Africanus to Gaius Marius, Sulla, and Pompey most
recently, victorious generals used their fame from wars abroad to improve their positions
politically. Caesar already had political prestige, having held the consulship. But he also
made powerful enemies during his tenure in Rome,forcing him to keep a close eye on the
city while in Gaul. To facilitate this he had Pompey and Crassus, his allies in the
26
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Triumvirate, as well as less prominent officials and agents working in his interest.
Beyond protecting himself from recall and prosecution by his enemies, Caesar had to win
the populace back to his side. During his term as consul, he failed to fulfill expectations
29

as a popular politician and suffered from low support at the end of his year,

In order to

recover the voters of the city, Caesar employed his war victories in two key ways. First,
he sent plunder back to the city and held celebrations, as evidence ofthe glory he was
winning for Rome. He spent some of this money on public works projects to the benefit
of the people. Secondly, he kept the Senate and public aware of his victories abroad. He
sent letters to the Senate and certain allies throughout the wars, and then published De
Bello Galileo, his war commentaries, in 51 B.C. These commentaries not only publicized
the details of his conquests, but allowed Caesar to subtly put his own spin on them.
These seven books, written in the third person, represent a very early and eloquent form
of propaganda for the people. At the same time, he hoped to win over,‘those senators
and knights who were still undecided, relatively open-minded and impressionable.

as

30

Meier asserts.

In these ways, Caesar maintained his political standing while increasing

his support from the populace(and hopeful some senators) during his decade stint abroad.
When the Senate finally succeeded in recalling him in 49 B.C., he had the military
backing and political influence to fight the optimates should they try to oppose him.
As Caesar prepared to leave for Gaul at the end of 59 B.C.,two important
situations arose in Rome. Publius Clodius Pulcher, a ruthless opportunist and tribune,
took action against both Cicero and Cato. Drawing much of his power from plebian
gangs, Clodius switched sides when his interests shifted, and was therefore an
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unpredictable and dangerous force.^' Clodius attempted to prosecute Cicero for
executing the Catilinarians as consul a year earlier. Caesar, who hoped to win Cicero to
his side as the best orator of the day, tried to protect him by offering him a position in
32

Gaul.

Cicero refused this however, and before the trial was completed went into

voluntary exile. For the time, Caesar lost a powerful potential ally in Rome. However,
Clodius then succeeded in sending Cato to Cyprus on a somewhat superfluous mission.
This eliminated the threat of Caesar’s most vehement eind capable enemy for the moment
33

as well.

He could breathe freely for a while in Gaul.

As Caesar’s victories accumulated, so did his wealth. He used this money, along
with Pompey £ind Crassus, to elevate his political friends and allies into political office
without returning to Rome. Caesar had two subordinate agents in this effort as well:
Lucius Cornelius Balbus and Gaius Oppius. These two men created an organization of
communications to keep Caesar informed of the happenings in Rome, while Caesar sent
34

them money for the election of favorable candidates,

This organization gave Caesar a

presence in Rome and kept him in contact with important figures, such as Cicero.
Crassus and Pompey were his allies, but they sought power just as he did and could not
be fully trusted. Oppius and Balbus, on the other hand, were devoted to Caesar, and he
consistently rewarded their dedication all the way through his dictatorship. By them, he
was “ever present in Rome through his ideas, is orders and advice, his gifts and his
35

^9

requests.

They were highly effective in their duties, which reflected in Caesar s ten
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year stay in Gaul. Even after Caesar’s death, their intricate organization remained in
36

place and successfully elevated Octavian as his heir.

Pompey and Crassus gradually became worried by Caesar’s success in Gaul,
wftile opponents like Ahenobarbus planned to remove him from command. In 57 B.C.,
Pompey had been put in charge of procuring grain for public distributions, which brought
with it great popularity. In 56 B.C. Caesar renewed the Triumvirate with Crassus and
Pompey. In this new agreement, the two were to run for the consulship in 55 B.C. Their
election would be secured by Caesar’s soldiers on leave, who would be sent to Rome for
the vote. In turn, they would receive governorships through 50 B.C., while Caesar’s term
in Gaul would be extended to the same year. After that, Caesar would ostensibly run for
the consulship of48 B.C., as there was a required ten-year interval between
consulships.^^ This renewal placed Caesar in a virtually untouchable position. With
Pompey and Crassus untied with him once more and their desires satisfied for the time
being, he could complete his conquest of Gaul. This agreement represents Caesar’s
innate ability to manipulate others, appeasing them while increasing his position
substantially. Crassus and Pompey either failed to realize how Caesar would exploit this
new agreement, or thought that he would fail in Gaul. Regardless, Caesar’s intellect once
more placed him in a most propitious position.
Despite his alliance, his agents at work, and his secured position, Caesar also
needed to revitalize his support fi'om the populace. He achieved this in several ways;
first, by public works projects. The enormous plunder he captured in the Gallic Wars
financed and rewarded his armies, his agents, and the elections of his candidates. But he
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also constructed several buildings, as physical evidence of his conquests for Rome. He
38

financed the Basilica Julia, a new Forum, and an election building in 54 B.C.
Generosity, such as this could be appreciated by all Romans. His benevolence improved
his public image- the people were impressed. Sallust writes,“Caesar was reckoned a
,,39

great man on the score of the favors he did and of his generosity.

Caesar also reported

his great victories to the Senate on a regular basis, so that celebrations were proclaimed
throughout the city. These public days of thanksgiving, according to Suetonius, were
„40

longer than any general before him had ever earned,

Also, after his daughter Julia’s

death in 54 B.C., he financed gladiatorial games and a public banquet in her honor.
Gestures, such as these, redeemed him in the eyes of much ofthe populace. His
aedileship taught him how to win the people, and he succeeded. Beyond his benevolence,
however, Caesar’s war commentaries had an enormous impact on his political life in
Rome.
By the year 51 B.C., when Caesar published his accounts of the Gallic Wars, his
political position in Rome again hung in the balance. Crassus died in battle against
Parthia in 53 B.C., and Julia died the year before, breaking his bond with Pompey. Since
then, the optimates gradually won his former son-in-law to their side, as a block against
Caesar. While they feared domination by both Caesar and Pompey,the oligarchy knew
that Caesar posed the greater threat. Consequently, they placed Pompey as their frontman. believing they could control him and dismiss him if he became too powerful.
the beginning of 52 B.C., the political situation in Rome had decayed considerably.
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At

Violence and bribery had delayed the elections for the year, culminating with the
murder of Clodius by Titus Annius Milo, who was running for the consulship. A state of
emergency ensued and leading Senators decided that only Pompey had the power to
restore order. He was named sole consul, instead of dictator, both for the public
impression and weaker powers granted."^^ Pompey quickly set about restoring order, but
basically had control of Rome. Pompey, and his new optimate allies, now posed a
serious threat to Caesar. But Caesar still planned to run for the consulship of48 B.C.,
and so sent his war records to Rome in preparation.
The Bello Galileo gives an excellent explanation of his ten year conquest of Gaul.
43

Even Cicero praised it for its eloquent style and clarity.

His writing here substitutes for

his oral rhetoric, as he could not actually address the citizens in Rome at the time.
Throughout the work Caesar goes into great detail highlighting the bravery of his soldiers
and the dangers they faced, shedding less light the setbacks he encountered. These seven
books were meant to bolster support for him, not serve as concise historical references,
44

although they are believed to be extremely accurate nonetheless,

Caesar did not change

the truth, but slightly skewed it in his favor.
Several attributes are highlighted within the Bello Galileo, which were central
Roman ideals. Examples of these include elementla (clemency),/?^/^^ (loyalty), and
45

dlgnltas (dignity).

He uses these ideals in describing his troops and their deeds, as well

as himself. In this way, he improves the public image of himself and his army. Whenever
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he attacks an enemy or acts cruelly towards the defeated he justifies it.

Thus, Caesar

makes himself out to be an ideal Roman general, and an ultimately victorious one.
Furthermore, he uses the idea ofthe power of the Roman people {imperium populus
Romanus)and his own power {imperium)interchangeably, so that he and the Roman
47

people become one.

These subtleties make his writings even more effective in

conveying his image.
Although many scholars believe these books were directed only at the upper
classes, T.P. Wiseman makes a good case against them. He rightly asserts that
publication, at this time, meant the writings would be read in a public area for the
populace to hear. As he puts it, “In late-republican Rome historical narrative was popular
,-48

entertainment.

So when Caesar describes in detail a largely failed British expedition,

he does so to impress the Roman people. Britain seemed a far-off place, but Caesar
traveled there to spread Roman civilization. He was the first Roman to bridge the Rhine
and inflict substantial losses on the Germans, which even Suetonius highlights despite its
relative insignificance."^^ Caesar utilized his writing fully, to impress and awe the Roman
people. When the consular elections came about in the summer of49 B.C., the stories of
his campaigns would still be fresh on their minds. Caesar’s publishing oiDe Bello
Gallico epitomizes a great leader utilizing his rhetorical skill to improve his public image.
His ten year proconsulship in Gaul provided the wealth, legions, and fame for
Caesar to fight and ultimately defeat his optimate opponents. But managing military and
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political careers simultaneously demanded the highest caliber of leadership, and Caesar
provided it. In only a decade, he conquered vast territory and turned Gaul into a truly
Roman region. His achievements required his intellect, rhetoric, confidence, and tactical
ability, which he employed to their fullest. His success was so great, that in 49 B.C. his
50

enemies chose civil war over allowing him to run consul.
restrain Caesar.
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Here too, they could not

Conclusion
Caesar’s Victory and Subsequent Failure
By the end of50 B.C., Rome sat on the brink of civil war. Cato and his allies
continually worked to force Caesar to disband his armies, planning to prosecute him
before he could run for consul (consuls were ineligible for prosecution until their terms
ended). Marcus Claudius Marcellus, a consul of that year, proposed that Caesar
relinquish his command in Gaul, that his opportunity to run for consul in abstentia be
cancelled, and that one of Caesar’s colonies have its citizenship revoked. The general
refused to allow this, as it meant his political demise. According to Suetonius, Caesar
said.“Now that I am the leading Roman of my day, it will be harder to put me down a
peg than degrade me to the ranks.

Seeking to avert war, one of Caesar s tribunes.

Gains Scribonius Curio, vetoed this bill. He requested that both Caesar and Pompey
relinquish their armies simultaneously to maintain peace. The Senate voted
overwhelmiiigly for this measure, which ostensibly prevented civil war, since neither side
would feel threatened by force. ^ Pompey would leave for his proconsulship in Spain,
and Caesar would use his agents in Pompey’s absence to secure election to the consulship
of48 B.C. After conquering all of Gaul on behalf of Rome, he deserved this opportunity.
But Cato and his followers feared this more than anything and refused to negotiate. In
expectation of war, the two vehement optimate consuls of that year, along with the
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consuls-elect for 49 B.C., ignored the Senate’s advice and charged Pompey to protect
Rome with two legions, while recruiting more forces in Italy. This mobilization, at the
bequest of a minority of Senators, was all but an act of war.
Marcus Antonius(Marc Antony)and Quintus Cassius Longinus, tribunes-elect for
the next year, promised to act on Caesar’s behalffollowing Curio’s term. They too,
attempted to prevent war and protect Caesar from his enemies. On January 1, 49 B.C., the
Senate decreed that Caesar must relinquish his command and dismiss his armies by a
specific date, leaving him open to prosecution before the consular elections. His newly
empowered tribunes vetoed this decree, which led to further debate in the Senate. Cicero
attempted to negotiate a peaceful solution to the situation by reducing Caesar’s command
to only Illyricum and one legion, but Cato would not accept this. On January 7, he and his
allies convinced the Senate to invoke a senatus consultum ultimum,(a power reserved for
state emergencies), which allowed the decree of January 1 to pass regardless of
tribimician veto. With their power overridden, Antony and Cassius fled Rome and joined
Caesar.
These hostile actions left Caesar little choice. After a decade expanding the
territory and glory of Rome,a few members of its elite intended to ruin him. The
measures taken by the Senate insulted Caesar’s dignitas, or dignity; a combination of
rank, prestige, and honor.^ This concept, similar to the chivalric ideal of honor, was of
the utmost importance to the Romans. As Caesar puts it, “dignity has always been of
„6
prime importance to me, even outweighing life itself. A man of Caesar’s status could
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never allow such effrontery. The oligarchy ignored his offers to maintain peace, and he
did not fear war. With his battle-tested legions, Caesar prepared to fight.
On the night of January 10,49 B.C., Julius Caesar led a single legion across the
River Rubicon and into Italy. He quickly advanced towards Rome,taking strategic cities
along the vvay. With news of Caesar’s fast approach, Pompey fled the capital to Capua
and then Brundisium. Caesar attacked him in the port city, but Pompey successfully
fought off his attacks and made his way across the Adriatic to Dyrrachium.^ In the
process of this rapid campaign, Caesar captured several optimate Senators and
equestrians. Marius and Sulla had confiscated their enemies’ properties, imprisoned and
even killed them. But Caesar saw the opportunity to win admiration through clemency.
Therefore, he freed his enemies with their property intact and absorbed their soldiers into
his army. His leniency, which he even used towards his great enemy Lucius Domitius
Ahenobarbus, evinced his morality and improved his image immensely.^ Although
C’aesar continually tried to negotiate a peaceful solution throughout his conquest of Italy,
the stubborn oligarchy and Pompey refused his offers. So Caesar sent his subordinates to
administet Rome, and prepared for full-scale war.
The Civil War marks a very complicated period in Caesar’s career. His enemies
controlled the East, Spain, and Africa. Caesar held only Italy and Gaul. The Roman
populace, for the most part, remained neutral in the war and waited to see the outcome.
Alter all. this war was between Pompey and Caesar, with their soldiers and factions.
Invadijig forces posed no threat, so choosing a side could only bring retribution if they
cliose poorly. The optimates had hoped that the citizens would side with them, and give
Appian. Civil fiar, II, 36-40.
Gelzer. 201-2.
359.
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Caesar no hope. To their dismay, as Syme puts it,‘Ttaly was apathetic to the war-cry of
10

the Republic in danger, skeptical about its champions.

The common people had

nothing in particular to gain from either faction; both were corrupt in some sense. They
needed only to await a victor, and then hope for a return to normal life.
The Civil War pitted Roman soldiers against one another; making their loyalty
dubious. But by reminding them of his victories in Gaul, promising property and money.
and recalling the oath they swore to him at the beginning of military service, Caesar kept
11

his armies together for roughly five years.

They mutinied at least once, in 47 B.C.; but

Caesar utilized his rhetoric to end the near revolt. According to the ancient sources,
when they demanded pay, he addressed them as “citizens” instead of soldiers, which
shamed them into repentance. Modem scholars believe, however, that he may have in
12

fact raised money to pay them and win them back.

Regardless, he quelled the mutiny

and utilized those forces in Africa. He enlisted defeated troops into his ranks as well, and
generally exercised clemency towards enemy soldiers and Senators alike. After all,
vengeance inspired hatred in his opponents, but Caesar sought victory and peace. Mercy
could endear men to him. In these ways, Caesar maintained his armies and attempted to
win support for his cause.
Militarily, the five year Civil War was hectic at best. I have highlighted the major
events below. In the war Caesar fought in the Greece, Spain, Asia Minor, and Africa,
against formidable armies, and dealt with uprisings and administrative problems
simultaneously. Pompey might have crushed him at Dyrrachium in 47 B.C., had he
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followed up his victory. But he failed to pursue Caesar’s retreating forces. Appian claims
that Caesar remarked after the battle,“Today my enemies would have finished the war if
,U3

the>’ had a commander who knew how to win a victory,

Following his near

destruction there, a highly outnumbered Caesarian army defeated Pompey at Pharsalus a
montli iaK !. Pompey then fled to Egypt, where a Roman soldier murdered him. Even
\N ilh ihcii c'lampion and others, including Ahenobarbus, dead, Cato and his remaining
a!

held out Caesar defeated the majority of them at Thapsus, North Africa, in a

rruhasn i icrory in 46 B.C. Cato committed suicide soon after. This battle marked the
real ciid of the war, and most of his opposition was killed in combat or the aftermath.
14

Vv'ii.h Catii’s death, as Dickinson remarks, it was,“the end of the republic.
Some optimates, however, managed to escape to Spain following Thapsus,
among them Pornpey's sons. Caesar returned to Rome after Thapsus to celebrate his
victorie.'?. but was forced to deal with this last gi'oup of Pompeians the next year. He was
neat 1 y o\ ercome at Munda in Spain, in 45 B.C, against his former lieutenant Labienus.
i-lere Cufi asserts he should have been defeated, but was saved by poor decisions on his
15

oppon..n: spart.

Caesar defeated and killed Labienus in battle, and soon after

Pomjiev’s eldest son was caught and executed. Caesar then returned to Rome with his
digiiitas m met and his power unopposed. His Civil War ended that year.
C aesar held Rome throughout the Civil War and so ran the government,
:ardlcss ‘'Tits legitimacy. He was elected Dictator in 49 B.C., but resigned the post and
ur ihe consulship the next year. He held this position four times between 48 and 44
C. He was named dictator for a year again in 47 B.C.; for ten years in 46 B.C., and
' Appian, Civi/
'Dickinson. 239.
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dictator perpetuus soon after Munda. On top ofthese positions, he was granted many
honors. He celebrated a total of five triumphs, over Gaul, Africa, Alexandria, Pontus,
and Spain. The Senate also attached the titles imperator and “the liberator” to his
\t

nanic.

The city erected statues in his honor, often placed in temples or next to Roman

heroes and ancient kings. The Senate even placed his statue in the Temple of Quirinus,
«17

with an inscription saying,“To the undefeated god.

The Romans had already begun

deifying him. Caesar controlled Rome, and the city celebrated his glory in excess. As
Meier puts it, “his achievements seemed to transcend everything known to Roman
«18

experience - or indeed human experience generally,

His honors reflected this reality.

whether he desired them or not. This extravagant praise, which for the most part he
accepted, eventually aroused severe jealousy from the old Pompeians and discontent in
general.
Unlike Cinna, Marius, and Sulla, Caesar welcomed his enemies back to Rome
following the Civil War. He returned to them their property and even enlisted them in his
administration. For example, he made Marcus Junius Brutus, the nephew of his bitterest
19

eneip}' Cato, urban praetor and promised him the consulship for 41 B.C.

Caesar used

his clemency to try and win his old opponents to his side. Herein lies his major mistake.
Because Caesar took power through war, instead of through normal political means, he
could not restore the members ofthe old regime and maintain autocratic power. This is
not to say he needed to execute or even exile them, only cripple their political capacity.
Although he wisely increased the Senate’s membership to nine hundred and installed
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many people loyal to him, the remnants of the oligarchy and its inheritors returned to
power as well. The old nobility retained their wealth and demanded recognition of their
prestige. Vying for primacy in Rome was their right. Caesar’s new Senators lacked the
clour of the establishment and its new champions,
rhe old aristocracy refused to accept the paradigm shift that occurred when
Caesar consolidated the power of the Roman state into his hands. He did not defer to
them for decisions in most cases, and generally failed to respect their traditional position.
Conseqiiently, the nohiles felt incapacitated. Caesar’s assassins claimed he planned to
bccoine king, and that they had liberated the Republic from a tyrant. In reality, they
acted in their own interests- not the state’s as they so pompously asserted. With Caesar
20

in power their prestige lay in his shadow, severely hampering their political potential.
Their futures demanded his removal.
Tlirough his victory Caesar had transformed the Roman state, and this
transfomiation necessitated alterations to the governmental institutions. Despite his keen
intellect, Caesar could find no solution to the problems of the Republic. His situation
parallels Mikhail Gorbachev’s in 1990: he wanted to maintain the old system and repair
its problems. In reality, of course, this was impossible; the institution was defunct. One
of his friends. Gains Matins, remarked,“If he, with his genius, could find no solution.
„21

who is fo find one now?

He was unprepared to overhaul the system, which was

necessary, and decided to procrastinate taking action by setting off on campaign against
Parthia. He would entrust the state to his loyal subordinates like Balbus. Aulus Hirtius,
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22

and Antony, with help from reconciled Pompeians,

Those Pompeians, however.

already conspired against him.
1 he other major problem that faced Caesar was his lack of open opposition. His
23

leadership style, like many others’, thrived on a clear and conquerable enemy,

The

fight drove him to succeed. In the wake of the Civil War, he faced only a broken
government and demands from the people. Admittedly, he administered Rome fairly
well: passing measures to repopulate the city, planning veterans’ colonies, controlling
24

grain distribution, curbing corruption, and even trying to simply the law code,

He

planned temples, a library, and expanded Rome’s boundaries, to the benefit of the people
as well as his image. But these problems offered him nothing to defeat, while an
expedition to avenge Crassus in Asia did. Casca and the others prevented that
undertaking.
Julius Caesar fell dead on March 15,44 B.C., stabbed twenty-three
times.

In less than sixty years he rose from relative obscurity to the highest position in

Rome: king, de facto, though he refused the title. He had achieved his ambition, and
became the first man in Rome. His intellect, rhetoric, and skill as an administrator and
general made this possible. He proved himself the consummate leader of his day. Gelzer
,,26

calls him,"‘a master of politics,

He was also a master of war, and used his skill in each

realm to overcome his adversaries. Caesar did not see the men who killed him as
enemies, but they were. Failure to adapt to the new political reality, which his murderers
could not accept, was his shortcoming. After his death his image became even greater
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than it had been during his lifetime. Cuff writes,‘"Caesar won no appellation such as
Felix or Magnus. He did not need one when he bequeathed his own name to the
.27

emperors’".

His name alone meant more than all the other titles given to the giants of

Roman history. Caesar transformed Rome from a republic to an empire. The change was
cemented by his grand-nephew and heir, Gains Octavius, who learned from the few
mistakes his benefactor made. Octavian, later named Augustus, proscribed his enemies
and kept the facade of the Republic in place. Thereby, he became the first real Roman
Emperor.

- Cuff, 35.
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Aedile - with a minimum age of thirty-six, aediles oversaw the city’s public works and
buildings, as well as markets and games.

Consul - the highest point on the cursus honorum, men could run for the consulship at
age forty-two. There were only two consuls sharing one year term. They held the greatest
administrative power when inside the city of Rome,and had imperium, or command over
the armies, outside it. Consuls spent much of their terms abroad, defeating foreign
annies and founding new provinces for theirs and the glory or Rome. Election to the
consulship was fiercely competitive but often lucrative, as they received bounty from
their actions abroad and were offered positions as proconsuls over provinces after their
terms.

Cursus Honorum - successive hierarchy of political offices in Rome. Men who entered
this could potentially rise from the lowest magistracies to the highest. Officially, this path
began with the position of military tribune; followed by quaestor, aedile (optional),
praetor, and finally consul.

Dictator - position outside the cursus honorum, which was reserved for extreme
circumstances like civil war or an invasion. After being appointed by the consuls and
approved by the Senate and people, the dictator had absolute control over the
government. He was even impervious to the tribunician power ofthe veto and
prosecution for his actions. The office was originally only a temporary one, to be
abandoned after the emergency had been resolved.

Patrician - originally the higher class of Roman citizens, who reserved certain rights for
themselves to keep their families in power. By Caesar’s time the only real distinction
between them and the plebians was that patricians could hold all offices two years earlier,
but could not run for the popular tribuneship.
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Plebian - originally the lower class of Romans, who had not been able to hold political
office. Eventually, their rights were expanded. Over time powerful plebian families rose
to high prominence in Roman politics, so that by Caesar’s time this distinction was
basically insignificant. They were eligible for the position of popular tribune.

Popular Assembly - official legislative body of Rome, consisting of all citizens. It was
divided into centuries and an*anged by class, and held the power to elect magistrates and
pass laws.

Popular Tribunes - the ten tribunes ofthe plebeians, who were elected annually from
the plebian assembly. The position existed outside the cursus honorum, and only plebians
could be elected. These men had the power to veto laws and actions as they chose, and
w'ere charged to protect common citizens from abuse. Their offices were sacrosanct so it
was highly illegal to harm them.

Praetor - at the age of thirty-nine men could run for the praetorship. Praetors were the
most important magistrates held within the city, both overseeing the running ofthe city
and acting as judges. When the consuls were outside the city praetors were the most
powerful men in the Rome and could command armies.

Pronconsul - basically a governorship, awarded to consuls after their terms. Provincial
governors could become extremely wealthy through their endeavors.

Propraetor - position given to praetors following their terms, in which they served under
a proconsul over a certain region of a province.

Quaestors - oversaw the treasury and public fund dispersals, men could run for this
position at the age of thirty.

Senate - body of about four hundred men at the time of Caesar, which had over time
come to dominate Roman politics. Men holding the office of quaestor were enrolled in
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the Senate: it was not an inherited position. The Senate claimed auctoritos, or authority,
and held a monopoly on what came before the assembly, excepting that tribunes could
also bring matters before them.
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